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The US airline industry is characterized to be an industry with a high competition 
mainly in the domestic segment. In order to face this competition several airlines entered 
in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals as way to consolidate its position in the market. 
This trend was accentuated with the global recession that brought several challenges to 
this industry. For this reason, the merger between United and Continental Airlines, two 
major US carriers, are being planned and its valuation and analysis are the focus of the 
present dissertation. By taking in account the current conditions of both airlines are 
estimated potential synergies of around 37,4% of the merged airline’ equity value without 
synergies which represent 69% of the current Continental’s market capitalization, the 
airline seen as the target. Given this, it is suggested an offer with a premium of 21,6% 
over the current Continental’s market capitalization which will constitute a deal of  $3,018 
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The present dissertation has as main objective to analyze a merger and acquisition 
(M&A) deal by presenting the strategic and financial reasons to engage in and the possible 
synergies arise from it.  In order to conduct this analysis is presented a real case, the 
merger between the United and Continental Airlines which announced their merger in 
2010. 
The period between 2008 and 2009 were characterized to be a period of hard 
economic conditions derived from the global recession which affect severely all the 
industries and put in risk the survival of several firms. The airline industry, as cyclical 
industry, was not exception by which was visible an increase in the debate about M&A’s 
deals as way to increase the profitability and sustainability at long-term in this industry. 
Before that is analyzed the above mentioned real case in order to evaluate the possible 
benefits that can arise from the deal and if it is actually a way to increase their profitability. 
Firstly, in the literature review are given a theoretical context about the main 
methods used in firm valuation as well as the main aspects related with the M&A deals 
which are referred and used in the practical part of the dissertation. 
In the next section, the section 3, is presented an analysis of the US airline industry 
to contextualize and explain the environment which both airlines faced at the time as well 
as the visible trends stated in the last years. In this section is also analyzed each of one of 
the airlines in order to provide a portrait of the firms situation and their recent trends. 
In section 4 is presented the valuation of each airlines as standalone with the 
explanation of the assumptions taken and the results achieved. After the valuation of the 
airlines in an independent way, the section 4 presents the valuation of both airlines 
together however, without taking in consideration the possible synergies that can arise 
from the deal. These synergies are approached in section 5 in which is analyzed their 
possible sources as well as the valuation of the merged airline with the synergies 
estimated. 
Finally, the section 6 approaches the main issues related with the M&A 




2. Literature Review 
The M&A’s are an important component of an economy being a way to increase the 
effectiveness and the profitability of the evolved firms and the same time solve problems 
such as the excess capacity of the industry (Koller et al. 2010). 
However, the M&A environment is highly changeable and complex where 
transactions involve a considerable amount of money (Bruner 2004). Several M&A’s 
transactions fail being the most common reason the fact of the acquirer firm has overpaid 
the target one. For these reasons, the valuation assumes a central role in this context since 
is crucial to calculate the value of the target firm as well as the value of the expected 
benefits in a feasible way (Petitt and Ferris 2013). 
Therefore, in order to provide a framework of the M&A’s transactions, this section 
contains a literature review of the main firm valuation approaches and of the main issues 
related with the M&A’s.  
2.1. Valuation Approaches 
According with Koller et al. (2010) the value is ‘the defining of measurement in a 
market economy’ being a useful measure of performance since it takes in account not 
only the long-term interests of the shareholders but also of the stakeholders. Therefore, 
the valuation is assumed as one of the key business skills in order to face business 
dilemmas by providing information to the managers (Bruner 2004). 
The process of choice of the appropriated valuation ‘approach is not straightforward 
being susceptible to several factors such as the objectives of the valuation, the 
characteristics of the firm or the preference of the analyst that are performing the 
valuation (Petitt and Ferris 2013).   
Damodaran (2006) refers that there are four major approaches to valuate a firm. The 
first approach is the discounted cash flow (DCF) which is based in the present value of 
the expected cash flows generated by the firm. The second approach, the liquidation and 
accounting valuation, is based on the value of the present firm’s assets. The third, called 
of multiple or relative valuation, values the firm by the use of multiples of comparable’ 
firms. Finally, the last approach is the contingent claim/option valuation that conducts the 
valuation through the use of option pricing models. 
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None of the methods are seen as the right, in the absolute sense, for valuate a firm 
since there is uncertainty about the future in each of the values projected (Chaplinsky et 
al. 2000). Besides that, the numerous of events that occurred in last decades had influence 
in the validity of the methods and the assumptions that they are based on (Torrez et al. 
2006). However, despite these facts, the DCF and the multiples approaches are the most 
popular and widely used methods among the analysts (Bancel and Mittoo 2014). Thus, in 
order to provide a more deep understanding, is analyzed these two approaches in the 
following sections. 
2.1.1. Discounted Cash Flow approach (DCF) 
According with Steiger (2008) the DCF method is based on a set of predictions 
about the future of the firm’s business activity being a method that relies on forward 
looking data. In this line, the author state that the firm’s value is based on the net present 







The FCF corresponds to the amount of cash that is not required for operations or 
reinvestment activities (Brealey et al. 2006). Concerning to the discount rate, the weighted 
average of cost of capital (WACC) is indicated as the appropriated one to determine the 
NPV (Chaplinsky et al. 2000) being their use a consensus point in the finance literature. 
The WACC will be deeply analyzed in the next section. 
This method is one of the most used among the analysts as were shown in different 
surveys such as the ones conducted by Schall et al. (1978) and Stanley and Block (1984). 
According with Koller et al. (2010) the popularity of this method is related with the fact 
that it bases exclusively on the flow of cash in and out of the firm and not on accounting-
based earnings. However, there is some reluctance about their feasibility which arises 
mainly from the uncertainty related with the projections of growth in revenue and 
earnings that are required (Feldman 2005). For its turn Kaplan (1986) states that the 
limitations of the DCF method are in fact limitations of the user and not of the technique. 
Actually, in a study conducted by Kaplan and Ruback (1996) they concluded that the 
estimations obtained by the DCF method are more close to the actual values than the 




2.1.1.1. Cost of Capital 
According with Pratt and Grabowski (2008) the cost of capital is “the expected 
rate of return that the market participants require in order to attract funds to a particular 
investment”. It also can be seen, in economic terms, as the opportunity cost of an investor, 
their required rate of return on assets of similar risk (Bruner 2004). So, the cost of capital 
represents the cost of firm’s financing in order to pursue their activity that can be a variety 
of sources since equity to debt passing from several instruments that are available to firms 
as ways to financing (Modigliani and Miller 1958). 
The finance literature states that the firm’s cash flows should be discounted at a 
rate that represents the firm’s risk characteristics. As the firm’s capital structure consists 
in equity and debt, the most common and more appropriated rate to use is the WACC 
which is a rate that takes in account the proportion of each of type of financing after tax 
cost of capital used (Mitra 2011). The WACC is calculated from the following formula 
(assuming only two kinds of financing: equity and debt):  
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  
𝐷
𝑉










 represents the ratio of each source of finance in the total value of the firm. In this 
line Fernández (2011) states that the WACC is an weighted average of two significant 
components: a cost that is from debt and an required return, more specificlly the required 
return to equity, that according with the author is not a cost.  
In general the finance literature states that to calculate the WACC should be used 
the target market weights of both sources of financing instead of current book weights in 
order to reflect the current conditions of the market. When the management repay the 
debt and if not want to change the capital structure it will repurchases shares and this must 
to do in market values. Other aspect is that the current weights may not represent the 
normal observable capital structure and so must be used the target weights that will 
prevail in the future (Koller et. al 2010 and Bruner 2004).  
In terms of the cost of debt (𝑘𝑑 ) it is calculated after taxes to reflect the benefits 
of the tax deductibility of the interest (Brotherson et. al 2013). In its calcultion is 




however, Cooper and Davydenko (2001) state that this way is not correct being necessary 
a measure that reflects the probability of default.  According with Pratt and Grabowski 
(2008) in certain situations the rate that the firm pays is not the current rate of the market 
and not reflects the current conditions of the firm, only reflecting the conditions of the 
time in which was issued. So, to take in account the current conditions of the firm, the 
analyst can use the debt ‘firm rating and infer from it the level of interest that the firm 
will pay according with their condition.   
In its turn, the cost of equity (𝐾𝑒) is commonly calculated through the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which is given by the following formula: 
𝐾𝑒 =  𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)       
According with Bruner (2004) this method is the most appropriated since it focus 
explicitly in the risk-return relationship however, Koller et. al (2010) states that this 
method no provide enough guidelines to use in firm valuation namely in the estimation 
of each of its components. Despite the criticism about their use, the CAPM keeps as the 
most popular method as can be seen in the survey conducted by Welch (2007) in which 
75% of finance professors recommend the use of this method to calculate the cost of 
equity. In the following subsections the author analyzes in more detail each component 
of the CAPM. 
2.1.1.1.1. Risk-free rate (𝑹𝒇) 
The risk-free rate is the first component of the CAPM model and according with 
Férnandez (2004) it is the rate that is obtained from the acquisition of governments bonds 
at the date of the estimation of the cost of equity. 
Koller et. al (2010) state that in order to calculate in a consisiting way the cost of 
equity and consequently the cost of capital should be use a government bond with a 
maturity equal to the time that is expected that cash-flows will be generated. However, 
the authors mentioned that the analysts frequently choose for simplicity the 10-year 
government bonds as proxy in the case of U.S. In other hand, Mukherji (2011) conducted 
a empirical study in order to analyse the best proxy for the risk-free rate in the U.S market 
and concluded that the Treasury bills are the best proxies to this rate than the long-term 





Beside the importance of the choice of the type of security to use as proxy for the 
risk-free rate, Damodaran (2008) states that it is also equal important the use of a risk-
free rate denominated in the same currency of the cash-flows estimated in order to achieve 
an accurate result. 
2.1.1.1.2. Beta (β) 
The other component of CAPM is the beta which is a parameter that measures 
how much the stock moves face to changes in the market (Koller et. al 2010). 
In the finance literature is evidenced that the beta estimation for an individual firm 
is not the most adequate practice since contains some statistical noise. In order to surpass 
this problem the analysts estimate the betas for a set of comparables of the firm valuated 
that operate in same business (Kaplan and Peterson 1998). According with Koller et al. 
(2010) this practice is better since as the estimated errors are not correlated across the 
firms, the possible misleading valuations of individual firms tend to be cancel when 
calculated an average of the industry beta. For this it is need to exclude the leverage effect 
in order to only compare the operating risks that the firms are facing. This fact lead us to 
the use of the  unlevered beta (or asset beta) which relationship with the leverege beta is 
given by the follow equation:  








 is the debt-to-equity ratio. After this process the unleverege beta needs to be 
adjusted to the current capital structure of the firm which will give the appropriated 
leverege beta. In the same way, Welch (2014)  purpose the use of the unleverege beta of 
the firm valuated at the first stage in order to not introduce misleadings in the results 
arised from the kind of financing use in the different firms of the industry. The author 
also states that the use of betas of the industry is valuable mainly in situations in which 
the firm is private and their investors are well diversified. 
In its turn, Kaplan and Peterson (1998) highlight that usually the analysts exclude 
the conglomerate firms from the estimation of the industry betas but these firms in some 
cases represent a significant share of the market which exclude them can introduce bias 




betas. According with Berk (1995) this relationship comes from the fact that the firms 
with a higher risk have a smaller market capitalization due the additional risk premium 
incorporate in the discount rate of them. The beta, that measures the systematic risk, will 
be higher for the firms that have a smaller market capitalization misleading the beta’ 
industry estimation. In order to solve this aspect, Kaplan and Peterson (1998) purpose a 
calculation of a market-capitalization-weighted industry beta that is achieved by a cross-
sectional regression of the individual betas against the industry percentages, which take 
in consideration the share of their sales that is attributable to the industry. 
2.1.1.1.3. Market risk premium (𝑹𝒎 − 𝑹𝒇) 
The last component of the CAPM is the market risk premium that is the difference 
between the expected market return and the risk-free rate, or in more secific words, it is 
the expected rate of return that a risky project should be offer in excess of which the risk-
free projects are offering (Welch 2014).  
Brealey et. al (2001) state that the average market risk premium over the last 73 
years is around 9 percent a year but in other hand Ibbotson and Chen (2003) for the same 
period estimate a market risk premium about of 5,9% . This is only two of several 
estimations given by several authors which ranging in a significant interval. Actually 
none model is universally accepted as the most adequate to estimate the market risk 
premium (Koller et. al 2010) and exist always the doubt if the period analyzed is a typical 
period where from which can be infered the market risk premium (Brealey et. al 2001)  
The historical arithmethic average of the risk premium is viewed among the 
several methods proposed by the finance literature as the better tool to calculate the 
market risk premium since the arithmetic average is very well accepted as the best 
unbiased estimator (Koller et. al 2010). However, there is some concerns about this 
method since it assumes independent returns and the evidence suggests autocorrelation in 
it which indicates the opposite (Kaplan and Ruback 1995).   
Beside the use of historical average of the market risk premium, the finance 
literature refers the realization of surveys to the analysts or investors in order to ask 
directly their perception about the market risk premium and the use of forward-looking 
models, namely the Gordon’s model, in order to isolate the cost of equity which it is 
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assumed that equals the return expected by the market, as common alternatives used to 
calculated this component (Fernández 2004). 
2.1.1.2. The Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) 
The FCFF method is one of the most common DCF approach used by the analysts 
to calculate the firm value (Kaplan and Ruback 1996). According with Stowe et al. (2007) 
the FCFF is ‘the cash flow available to the company’s suppliers of capital after all 
operating expenses (including taxes) have been paid and necessary investments in 
working capital and fixed capital have been made’.  
As referred by Eston et al. (2013) the first step in the calculation of this method 
consists in to forecast the FCFF for each period for a certain time horizon (between 4 to 
10 years) and discounts them by an appropriate rate. The second step consists in to 
determine the terminal value in the post-horizon period. The sum of these two parts will 
provide the firm value as the following equation shows (Damodaran 2002):  











It is common the use of the Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) of the firm 
as point of start to calculate it FCFF (Stowe et al. 2007) which relationship between them 
are given by the following equation (Bruner 2004):  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇(1 − 𝑡) +  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 − ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶
+  ∆𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 
Where Capex is the capital expenditures and the NWC is the net working capital 
corresponding to the investment and operational expenses mentioned in the definition 
provided above. In terms of the discount rate, as the FCFF is the cash flow generated by 
the firm and that is available for all investors including the debt holders and equity holders 
(Steiger 2008), the WACC is indicated as the most appropriated rate since takes in 
account the firm’s capital structure (Koller et al. 2010). Other important fact is that this 
FCFF does not include tax benefits related with interest payments since this will be taken 
in account when the cash flows are discounted by the WACC which already incorporates 





the tax advantage of debt are the most adequate to calculate the FCFF (Damodaran 2002 
and Shrieves and Wachowicz 2001). 
2.1.1.2.1. Terminal Value 
From a certain point of time is unreasonable to estimate the FCFF for each period 
once there is less justification for the variables variation due the distance on the time 
(Quackenbush 2013) whereat can be applied a perpetuity-based formula after the explicit 
period which result will correspond to the terminal value (TV) (Koller et al. 2010). The 
perpetual constant growth model is the most used model to estimate the TV of a firm 
(Lütolf-Carroll and Pirnes 2009) assuming that the FCFF will growth at a constant rate in 
perpetuity (Gentry and Reily 2007) as shown in the equation 5. 
Frequently the TV has a significant impact in the estimated firm value becoming 
a key factor in this process (Cornell 1993) as shown by Bruner (2004) that analyzed a 
sample of stocks of the New York Stock Exchange and found that the TV accounts for 
about 90% of their share prices. Due its importance is crucial to make a realistic 
estimation of the main economic value generators: the period of time, the growth rate 
(which will be analyzed in the next section) and the base FCFF that needs to be 
representative of the business’ future and from which the extrapolation will be made 
(Lubian 2010). 
Aside of perpetual constant growth approach, the multiples method is also 
commonly referred in the finance literature as a way to determine the TV. In this approach 
the analyst searches for comparable firms in the industry of the firm analyzed and try to 
find a relevant multiple in that industry to determine the TV (Lütolf-Carroll and Pirnes 
2009). 
Finally, a special case occurs when is expected that the firm will cease their 
operations in the future. In this case is more suitable consider the liquidation value as TV 
which represents the value of the assets that are expected to obtain in a fire sale at a certain 
point of the future (Damodaran 2002). 
2.1.1.2.1.1. Long-term growth rate 
The long-term growth rate is one of the main inputs in the calculation of the TV 
which, as stated in the previous section, accounts for a large portion of the total estimated 
firm’s value. It is visible that small changes in the long-term growth originates significant 
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changes in TV and consequently in the firm value whereat it plays an important role in 
the valuation process but the fact of it be based in the judgment has originate several 
debates about their estimation (Rotkowski and Clough 2013). 
The sum of the expected long-term rate of consumption growth of the respective 
industry (or real growth) and the expected inflation for the economy is seen by the most 
of the authors as the best estimation for the long-term growth rate (Koller et al. 2010). 
This estimation takes into consideration not only the expected real growth rate but also 
the capacity of the firm to surpass the effects of the inflation (Bruner 2004).  
The growth rate, in most of the cases, is in a range from 0 % to 5 % having to be 
positive since the economies always grow at long-term (Steiger 2008). However, the 
long-term growth rate shouldn’t be greater than the growth rate of the economy since as 
the firm grows is more difficult for it maintain a higher growth rate due the competitive 
conditions at long-term, converging to an equal or lower level of the economy’s growth 
rate  (Damodaran 2002 and Feldman 2005). 
2.1.1.3. The Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
In the previous method all future cash flows are discounted at a constant WACC 
but to it be constant is assumed that debt financing doesn’t have impact on the rate and 
the debt ratio of the firm remains unchanged over the time (Booth 2002). However, in 
most of the cases these conditions are not observable. The firm’s debt ratio tends to grow 
in a consistent way with the firm’s value or the firms can plan to change their capital 
structure over the time, factors that have impact on the cash-flows that are used to repay 
the debt. However, a constant WACC not takes in account these types of situations and 
would overstate the present value of future tax shields of the debt (Thompson 1997 and 
Koller et al. 2010). Faced with this situation, most of the authors purpose the use of the 
APV approach as the most adequate way to surpass it. 
According to Luehrman (1997), the APV approach, unlike the WACC, 
disintegrates and examines the financial operations separately. The author states that it 
views the value of the levered firm as the sum of the firm as totally financed by equity 
(base-case) with the all incremental cash flows that arises from the leverage:  
𝐴𝑃𝑉 =  𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠  (2.7) 
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In the calculation of the base-case is need to consider the firm without debt and 
discount it free cash flows by it unlevered cost of equity that is the cost of the equity 
assuming that not exist debt on the firm’s capital structure (Damodaran 2002 and Stowe 
et al. 2007). The financing side effects includes both the benefits and the costs related 
with the leverage namely the interest tax shields that arises from the tax deduction of the 
interests, the subsidies to debt financing from the governments, the costs of issue new 
securities and the direct and indirect costs related with financial distress (Ross et al. 2002).  
These effects should be discounted at the borrowing rate since the debt service is 
predetermined and are independent of the future firm’s performance (Inselbag and 
Kaufold 1997). 
Some authors, as Fernández (1995) and Inselbag and Kaufold (1997), 
demonstrated that both the APV and WACC approaches are equivalents yielding the same 
results when appropriately applied.  However, the APV approach is seen as the most 
adequate and practical to implement when the firm has a non-fixed debt ratio over the 
time (Inselbag and Kaufold 1997) and by the fact of be a method that provides information 
to the managers about which are the sources of value’s creation (Luehrman 1997). 
2.1.2. Multiples valuation approach 
The valuation of equity using multiples is one of the most used methods as has 
been evidenced in several studies such as the Carter and Van Auken (1990) and Bancel 
and Mittoo (2014).  The popularity of this method is mainly related with their simple way 
to compute being possible to realize it with many fewer assumptions and in a speedily 
way compared with the cash flow valuation. Moreover, the multiples method helps to test 
the feasibility of the cash flows and it is a method that reflects the current situation of the 
market and their prespective in respect of which firm is more able to create value 
compared with the competitors (Koller et. al 2010). However, Damodaran (2002) states 
that as multiples reflects the market mood this can imply a high estimation when the 
market is overvaluing comparable firms and a low estimation when the market is 
undervaluing comparable firms thus not reflecting the reality. 
The finance literature in general mentioned three essential aspects that are need to 
take in account when this method is used: the choice of the multiple,  it calculation and 
the definition of the firm’s comparables. 
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According to Eberhart (2004) the choice of the multiples is one of the main aspects 
to take in account since the valuation can be significantly sensible to the ratio, sometimes 
inducing in not feasible results.  
The enterprise value to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciations and 
amortizations (EV/EBITDA) is one the most used multiple and according with Koller et. 
al (2010) used as a point of start once it contains essential information about the firm 
namely the growth rate, the return on invested capital (ROIC), the operating tax rate and 
the cost of capital. The same author states that the use of the multiple EV/EBITDA is 
more appropriated than the use of the ratio with the earnings before interests and taxes 
(EV/EBIT) since the depreciations and amortizations are an accounting artifact that arises 
from past acquisitions and are not tied with future cash flows distorting the results. 
However, the EV/EBITDA has also some limitations mainly the fact that not includes the 
changes in working capital and capital investments (Férnadez 2001). 
Other common multiple used is the price-earnings ratio (P/E) that is a ratio of the 
firm’s current share price to it per share earnings. According with Gaughan (2011) this 
multiple is more appropriate if the historical earnings of the firm were stable given a more 
accurate prediction. However, when it is compared with the EV/EBITDA the last one are 
more feasible because it only accounts for operating performance while the P/E ratio is 
affecting by the firm’s capital structure and it net income is calculated after  nonoperating 
items and one-times gains and losses which can artifficaly increase or decrease it (Koller 
et. al. 2010). 
The multiples mentioned above are only two of a set of different multiples that 
can be choosen  to valuate a firm but the effectiveness differs between them. Lie and Lie 
(2002) conducted a research about the feasibility of several multiples and concluded that 
the estimation achieved with the asset multiple are more exact when compared with 
multiples related with earnings or sales. In other hand, Chaplinsky et. al (2000) states that 
the market multiples are more subject to distortions and consequently less effective due 
the market misvaluations and accounting policies.  
Also is important to take in account the implications of the use of forward looking 
multiples and the historical ones. According with Koller et. al. (2010) the forward-looking 
multiples are more feasible when compared with the historical ones since they are 
consisting with the valuation principle of that the value of the firm should be equal to the 
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present value of future cash flow. Liu and Thomas (2002) conducted a research about this 
aspect and found that the multiples based on forward earnings explain reasonably well 
giving a better measure of the performance than the historical and cash flows measures. 
However, Lie and Lie (2002) concluded in their study that there are not improvement in 
the estimation with the use of forward looking multiples instead of historical even with 
adjustments for firm’s cash level. In the same way, Bruner (2004) states that the use of 
forward looking multiples can not be the most appropriated choice mainly in growth firms 
since the growth rate of the follow period can be higher which can induce in misleading. 
Other fact that is need to take a special attention is the way as the multiples are 
calculated, or in other words, if they are calculated in a consistent way to not induce in 
misleading results (Koeller et. al 2010). Damodaran (2002) states that one of the key tests 
in the calculation of a multiple is examine if the numerator and denominator of it are 
defined consistently, for instance if the numerator is an equity value the denominator 
should also be in order to give an accurate result.  
Finally, the choice of the comparable firms is the other crucial issue in the multiples 
method. According with Eberhart (2004) the firm’s comparables are the set of firms that 
are in the the same industry of the valued firm. Damodaran (2002) states that a 
comparable firm is one that has similar cash-flows as well as similar potential growth for 
long-term and risk level.  In addition, Koller et. al (2010) states that beside the similar 
outlooks for long term-growth, the comparable firms needs to have a similar ROIC. So, 
to form the peer group of the valued firm is need to choose firms that have charatectirsts 
related with the production, distribution and research and development (R&D) that leads 
mainly to similar figures of growth and ROIC. 
2.1.2.1. Transaction multiples 
In the specific case of M&A’s, the use of comparable transactions as benchmark 
to valuate the target firm is a common practice where the analysts base their valuation on 
a range of previous acquisitions in order to establish a framework (Chaplinsky et. al 2000 
and Gaughan 2011). 
This approach is similar with the general multiples valuation mentioned above by 
using most of the same multiples. The main difference is that this method reflects in their 
multiples the premium paid in other transactions which are not present in the traditional 
23 
  
multiples giving to the acquiring firm a guideline about what was practiced before (Bruner 
2004).  
According with Chaplinsky et. al (2000) the analysts needs to compare the target firm 
with similar deals from last year or two in order to calculate the median and average 
transaction multiples. Most similiarly is the previous acquisitions with the the one that 
the analyst is valuating most information he get about how the market has valued assets 
of this type. 
2.2. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
M&A is a strategy followed by firms for corporate restructuring and control that has 
an important role in external corporate expansion (Piesse et. al 2013) and it is one of the 
most important instruments by which the firms respond to changes in environments 
conditions and use to expanding their operations in order to increase their long term 
profitability (Bruner 2004). 
Typically, M&A transactions are complex and there are many important issues that 
influence the own transaction and the performance of the post-acquisition firm that are 
needed to take in account. Some of these issues are addressed by the author in the 
following sections.  
2.2.1. Types of M&A 
Damodaran (2002) refers that there are several ways of one firm acquire another 
one, being possible to classify them as merger, consolidation, tender offer, acquisition of 
assets, leverage buyouts or management buyouts. 
A merger is the grouping of two or more companies by purchase acquisition 
whereby only one of companies maintain their identity while the others are being 
dissolved with the integration (Ferrer 2012).  In this case, the acquiring firm assumes all 
assets and liabilities of the acquired firm ceasing it existence and giving shares in the new 
entity or cash to their former shareholders by the sell. Usually, in a merger there is a 
visible acquirer that is the larger firm whose management will be responsible for the new 
entity, however there is also situations in which both firms’ dimension is similar, called 
of merger of equals, and so both management boards are responsible in the new entity 
(Brealey et. al 2001).  
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According with Gaughan (2011) a consolidation is a transaction in which all the 
companies are dissolved to create an entirely new entity and it is the only one that 
continues to operating. In this case the original firms cease to exist and their shareholders 
become shareholders in the new entity. According with author the term consolidation is 
more adequate when both firms involved in the transactions are approximately with the 
same dimensions. 
In the case of a tender offer, Brealey et. al (2001) refers that it is a direct takeover 
attempt realized by outsiders to the shareholder’s target to buy their stock ignoring, in 
most of the cases, the directors board ‘opinion of the target. The acquired firm keeps their 
identity and it is a separated entity, the only difference is that now is owned by the acquirer 
firm which obtained the control. According with Damodaran (2002) the acquired firm 
remains a separated entity once there are minority shareholders that not sell their position, 
however most of the tender offers tend to become mergers when these shareholders decide 
to sell.  
In its turn, in the purchase of assets the acquiring firm acquires the assets of the 
target firm. Usually the target firms sell only part of their assets and the payment is 
frequently made directly to the selling firm rather than to the shareholders (Brealey et. al 
2001) but is needed a formal approval of them to engage in the deal (Damodaran 2002). 
The last two types of acquisitions: leverage buyout (LBO) and management 
buyout (MBO) differs from the others mentioned. According with Brealey et. al (2001) 
the LBO is an acquisition conducted by a group of investors in which the acquired firm 
becomes a private firm and their shares cease to trade in the markets. The main feature of 
a LBO is the fact that a significant proportion of the acquisition is financed with debt. A 
MBO differs from a LBO only because the group of investors is led by the current 
management of the firm whose becomes owner-managers and remain in administration 
of it. 
In the finance literature the authors regularly also classify the mergers as 
horizontal, vertical or conglomerate mergers but according with Ross et. al (2002) the 
acquisitions also can be classified in the same way.  
According with Ross at al. (2002) and Gaughan (2011) horizontal acquisitions 
happens when both firms involved in the acquisition are in the same industry and are 
25 
  
direct competitors in the market for what the main goal of the acquirer is the increase of 
their market power. For its turn, a vertical acquisition happens when the firms has a buyer-
seller relationship, or in other words, are in different stages of the production process 
which allows the acquirer firm integrate more stages of the production cycle in their core 
business. Finally, an acquisition is classified as conglomerate when the companies are not 
related and are not competitors which the main goal is create value for the shareholders 
with a higher level of diversification. 
Lastly, many authors in the finance literature also classify the acquisitions 
according with endorsement of the target’s management: hostile versus friendly 
acquisitions. Morck et al. (1988) refer that a hostile acquisition typically happens when 
the target’s management board refuses from the start the proposal made by the acquiring 
firm and put barriers in the achievement of an agreement being the friendly acquisition 
the opposite situation. 
2.2.2. Reasons for M&A 
In the finance literature are provide a large number of reasons that motivate the 
firms to engage in acquisitions deals however not all of them translates in an increase of 
the shareholder’s wealth. 
According with the efficiency theory, the synergies are one of the main reasons 
for the firms to engage in acquisition’s deals (Trautwein 1990). If the acquirer firm is 
more efficient than the target firm and both are in the same industry, so the acquiring firm 
can engage in an acquisition deal since it is able to increase the efficiency of the acquired 
firm at least to their efficiency level taking advantage of synergies (Piesse, et. al 2013). 
To test the validity of this theory, Mukherjee (2003) conducted a survey to CFO’s of 721 
firms involved in acquisitions and mergers realized between 1990 and 2001 and 
concluded that actually the main reason for acquisitions is the synergies with 37,3 % of 
the answers.  
The increase of market power is other very common reason use for proceed with 
an acquisition. According with Piesse (2013) the increase of the market power allows the 
firm to control the quality, price, and supply of its products due the scale of its production 
and allows the firm to achieve higher profits and at the same time place barriers to new 
entrances in the market contributing for a higher growth rate. 
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Frequently the firms use the acquisitions also to increase their competiveness 
through the achievement of economies of scale, economies of scope or economies of 
vertical integration. When firms engage in an acquisition deal with the purpose of achieve 
economies of scale it wants to take the opportunity of spread the fixed costs with a higher 
level of production (Brealy et. al 2001). For its part, economies of scope are economies 
of scale applied not only a product but a set of products that are produced jointly and that 
allows the firm decreases the costs of production that would not be possible with the 
production of only one of them (Motis 2007). Finally, with the vertical integration the 
firm add closely related activities which becomes easier the coordination of the operations 
increasing the efficiency and decreasing the costs (Ross at al. 2002). 
Other motive behind the acquisitions is related with the improvement of 
managerial efficiency. Ross at al. (2002) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) stated that the 
value to some firms could be increased by the changing of their management. Some firms 
managers are resistant in to adapt their strategies and the own structure of the company 
to the changes of the market and technological conditions becoming their management 
inefficient. So, the acquirer firm can see an opportunity to acquire these firms and benefit 
of a more efficient management from their managers contributing to a high level of 
profitability. 
All these motives mentioned can contribute to an increase of shareholder’s wealth 
however there are motives behind the acquisitions that can origin a decrease in their 
wealth placing them in a worst situation. The managerial hubris, the free cash-flow and 
the agency motive theory are the most frequent motives mentioned in the finance 
literature that can have a harmful influence in the wealth’s shareholder. 
The managerial hubris hypothesis was proposed by Roll (1986) and states that the 
managers of the acquiring firms can be overconfident about their abilities in the 
management of the target firm and as consequence they are more willing to overpay for 
it which can induce future losses to the shareholders. 
In part linked with the previous one, the agency theory states that managers tend 
to seek their own individual goals and maximize their welfare in expense of the 
shareholders. In the case of a diversified firm and where the management not own a 
significant proportion of the firm ‘shares they tend to pursue strategies that will give them 
more control and a higher compensation in expense of the shareholder’s wealth (Piesse 
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et. al 2013). The managers when believe in their management abilities and that they are 
able to perform better the target firm are more willing to overpay for an acquisition in 
expense of the shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). 
In terms of the cash flow theory, Jensen (1986) states that the managers whose 
firm has a significant amount of excess cash are more likely to engage in acquisitions 
changing the payout policy which may lead to interest conflicts with the shareholders. 
The managers believe that spend the excess cash in acquisitions are more preferable than 
to pay it to shareholders. For them the payment of dividends will not bring benefits 
whereby the acquisitions are more attractive mean to conserve the corporate wealth 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1991). 
At last, it is also used  the diversification reason as motive to engage in acquisition 
deals, but it is considered by the majority of authors a dubious reason since it not have a 
linear impact on shareholder’s wealth. According with Roberts et. al (2012) a large 
number of studies concluded that the unrelated acquisitions not reduce the risk faced by 
the acquired firm since a more diversified firm tends to place less effort in developing 
specifics tools and techniques to deal with individual problems related to its range of 
business. 
2.2.3. Synergy and the acquisition premium 
Synergies translates into the ability to make a combination of firms more profitable 
than they are individually, being this fact one of the most important in the determination 
of the premium paid by the acquirer (Gaughan 2011). According Ismail (2011) the post- 
merger equity value of the combined firm is the sum of equities value of each firm before 
the merger plus the present value of the synergies that will be generated (2.8):  






+  𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦  
The maximum price that the acquirer firm is able to offer is given by the difference 
between the equity value of the combined firm and the equity of the acquirer firm which 
translates in the sum of the equity value of the target with the synergies. This implies that 
the premium that the acquirer firm is willing to pay will depend of the estimated synergies 
(Davidson 1985). According with Eccles et. al (1999 the acquirer company needs to offer 
a higher price than the intrinsic value of the firm in order to incentive the target 




intrinsic value plus the synergy value, taking in consideration that the acquirer 
shareholders avoid to achieve this value to not give all the synergies to target’s 
shareholders.  
However, Ismail (2011) states that managers use estimated synergies more to 
induce the shareholders to engage in the deal than to define the premium that will be paid 
in the acquisition. In addition, Slusky and Caves (1991) suggest that the maximum price 
depends not only of the willingness of the acquirer firm pays for these synergies but also 
of the willingness of the target’s management. The target management has a tendency to 
lower the maximum price of the acquirer firm to conserve its independence and the 
bargaining power between the parties.  
Towards this, the measure of synergies is a crucial point in an acquisition 
transaction. According with Cullinan et. al (2007) to calculate the value of the synergies 
is need to distinguish the different types of synergies and measure the potential value and 
the probability that they will be realized. While the cost reductions are the most common 
factor mentioned as origin of synergies because can be realized in short term and the 
probability to occur is higher, Camara and Renjen (2004) says that the success of mergers 
depends mostly of the vision of how the combined firm is able to increase their revenues 
and market share as a combined entity, or in other words, the capacity of the firm to 
choose the best characteristics of the two firms that will contribute for the creation of 
value.  
According to Damodaran (2005) the synergies can be classified according with 
the potential source in two major groups: operational synergies and financial synergies. 
The operating synergies translate in the capacity of the firm increase their operating 
income with a more efficient use of the existing assets by the combination with other firm 
whereas the financial synergies can be translate in a reduction in cost of capital or in 
higher cash flows due financial benefits, as interest tax shields, in the new entity.    
Concerning to operating synergies and according with Devos et. al (2009) they 
can be divided in two categories: the synergies that origin is the increase of operating 
profits and the synergies that comes from the savings from reductions in investments. If 
a firm engages in a merger primarily to increase the market share or the market power it 
is expected that the operational synergies will come from a higher operating income due 
the revenue increase or costs savings. On other hand, if a merger occurs primarily to take 
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advantage of scale or scope economies, the operating synergies will be originating due 
the revenue increases or costs savings but also from reductions in investments. Regarding 
with financial synergies, the author stated that it is observable if the primarily reason of 
the merger is tax reasons or a decrease in cost of capital. 
Despite the motives behind the merger, the success of it and the realization of the 
synergies depend of an efficient deployment of economic resources with a good 
coordination of business assets and an effective management team (Slusky and Caves 
1991). 
2.2.4. Methods of payment 
The method of payment is an important factor along with the expected synergies 
that influence the premium paid for the acquisition (Wansley et. al 1983).  The success of 
the transaction and the future benefits from it can be strictly dependent of the choice of 
the payment form, if is in cash, stock or a combination of two (Ismail and Krause 2010). 
According with Rappaport and Sirower (1999) in stocks payments the acquiring’ 
shareholders give to target’s shareholders a percentage of ownership in the new firm, 
establishing a ratio exchange of shares, whereby they share with them the risk of the 
synergies will not be materialized, however at the same time they also share the future 
value and will dilute their position in post-merger entity. In share payments the acquiring 
firm can choose between fixed shares modality, where the number of shares is fixed but 
the value can change between the announcement date and the closing date not affecting 
the ownership structure, and fixed value modality where the value of the shares is fixed 
and the final ownership structure only is establish in the closing date when the final price 
is defined. In terms of cash payments the authors stated that it is a simple transfer of 
ownership where the acquiring shareholders support the entire synergy risk but avoiding 
the dilution of their position in the new entity.  
In general it’s observable that the shareholders of the target company prefer the 
cash payment from the acquirer and in fact empirical studies demonstrates that the target’s 
shares suffer a significantly positive return after the announcement for cash offers (Ismail 
and Krause 2010). However, when managers of the target firm values their influence in 
the combined firm will prefer the payment with shares rather than cash in order to enable 
them the job retention (Ghosh and Ruland 1998). Similar situation happens when the 
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shareholders have strong expectation in benefit from the future synergies (Rappaport and 
Sirower 1999). On the side of the acquiring firms the managers prefers cash payments to 
avoid ownership dilution and consequently avoid the loss of control in the firm post-
merger (Harris and Raviv 1988) and empirical evidence shows that the acquiring 
shareholders in pure share offers suffer, in most of the times, significant losses (Travlos 
1987). 
 
The choice of the payment method is also related with the characteristics of the 
acquiring and the target’s firm as well as with the environmental conditions.  An acquirer 
company that wants to show that are confident in the deal and consequently take the risks 
tends to choose the cash payment (Rappaport and Sirower 1999). An acquiring firm that 
has a low cash balance when compared with the value of the acquisition tends to use stock 
as payment method (Martin 1996). If the acquirer firm believes that their shares are 
undervalued in the market tend to opt for a cash payment in order to avoid the issue of 
new shares. When a firm issues new shares to finance an acquisition, the market receives 
this issuance as a signal that the firm’s managers believe that their shares are overvalued 
which consequently induce a drop in their value penalizing the current shareholders 
(Rappaport and Sirower 1999). When exists a real or potential competitor for the 
acquisition of the target’s firm, the acquiring firm is more likely to use cash payment in 
order to anticipate the competition (Martin 1996).  
It is also defined as economically important determinants in the choice of the 
payment method the return correlation between the stocks of the merging firms, if there 
are the existence of defense mechanism and whether the merger is hostile (Ismail and 
Krause 2010) being the last factor typically related with cash payments while the friendly 
transactions are associated with shares offers (Travlos 1987). 
2.2.5. Post M&A returns 
When a firm enters in an M&A strategy is with the aim to improve its profitability 
and increase the wealth of the current shareholders. Along of the last decades an extensive 
research has been done to analyze whether the M&A are profitable or conversely they 
translates in a wealth reduction for shareholders and these empirical studies demonstrated 




According with Damodaran (2005) the presence of synergies will not necessarily 
translate in gains for the acquiring shareholders. The author states that the clear winners 
in M&A transactions are the target firms’ shareholders earning significant returns not 
only in the days around the announcement of the transaction but also in the follow periods. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) reviewed much of the scientific literature about 
corporate takeovers and stated that the evidence shows that the shareholders of the 
acquirer firm earns profits close to zero in a merger case while the target shareholders 
earn significant profits with an average return around announcements of 20% in 
successful mergers. 
Other studies focused more in long-term analysis than the periods around the 
announcement to analyze the returns for both shareholders. One of these studies was 
performed by Loughran and Vijh (1997) where they analyze five-year post acquisition 
returns using 947 mergers during the period between 1970 and 1989  taking in account 
the type of merger and the form of payment. They found that in transactions in which the 
cash is used as payment method the returns are higher, being this difference ranging from 
-25% in the case of stock mergers to 61,7% in the case of cash tender offers. According 
with the authors this findings are in line with the hypothesis that managers tend to choose 
stock as payment method when they believe that their firm is overvalued. Concerning 
with the target shareholders they found that in general they gains from the transactions 
however the shareholders who received stock as payment method for the transaction 
suffers a decrease in their gains level over time.  
Agrawal et. al (1992) also focused their research in long term returns after 
adjusting the firm size effect and the beta risk for a sample of mergers in which both 
parties are quoted in NYSE/AMEX and occurred between 1955 and 1987. They found 
that the acquiring shareholders suffers a wealth loss of around 10% over the five year 
after the merger and concluded that this finding not seems to be caused by changes in beta 
after the transaction. 
Other authors focused in the returns to acquiring and target firm combined to 
analyze the net economic gain of the transaction. According with Bruner (2004) most of 
the researches performed concluded that the combined firms reported significantly 
positive returns which suggests that M&A does pay the investors in the combined acquirer 
and target firms. 
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Considering the several studies that are made about this subject is evident that the 
acquirer firm shareholders not necessarily receive the gains from the acquisition and the 
winners are the targets firm shareholders. As Damodaran (2005) stated even in cases 
where synergy is real, the acquiring shareholders get little or none of the benefits from it. 
One of the reasons to this happen is the fact that in a significant percentage of acquisitions 
the acquiring firms pay more than the total value of the synergies originating a worst 
situation for acquiring shareholders. 
2.3. Conclusions 
In last sections were covered the main firm valuation aspects as well as several 
issues about the M&A’s transactions. As visible in the finance literature, the DCF and the 
multiples methods are the most popular and widely used to conduct a firm valuation by 
which these two methods will be applied in the present dissertation, always taking in 
account the details mentioned and covered in this section. Relatively to M&A transactions 
is concluded that it will not necessarily will translate in an increase of the shareholder’s 
wealth by which is need to take in account the factors described above , namely the motive 
behind of the deal and the way that the synergies and consequently the premium to be 
paid are estimated. 
After this theoretical context is analyzed the US airline industry in the next 
sections as well as the individual firms in order to give a portrait of their situation which  
is need to be take in account in the M&A valuation that are also approached in the 
following sections. 
3. Industry and firms analysis 
3.1. Analysis of US airline industry  
3.1.1. Industry Overview 
The US airlines industry accounts for a major part of the global airlines industry 
representing 40,3% of its value in 2009 (Datamonitor 2010). Focusing in the national US 
economy, this industry represented 5,2%1 of its value in 2009 (with $1,3 trillion 
                                                          
1 Taking in account the entire civil aviation sector 
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generated) with an employment impact of 10,2 million jobs which represented 7,3% of 
the total jobs in that year (FAA2 2011).   
This industry is characterized by having several types of firms with different 
segments of business by which the U.S. Department of Transportation (US DOT) classify 
them in four groups of carriers taking in account their revenues: the majors, the national, 
the regional and the cargo carriers (App. 1). The US airlines industry comprises around 
100 certified passenger airlines which represents to approximately 10 million flight 
departures per year (Belobaba et al 2011). From these airlines, 17 was classified by US 
DOT as major passenger airlines in 2009 (App. 2) with an annual revenue of equal or 
over $1 billion. In terms of market capitalization, the US airlines industry valued $58 
billion in 2009 in which the major airlines represented the majority of the most valuable 
airlines (App. 3). 
The passenger transport is the primary source of the US airline industry 
accounting for 52% of the total operating revenue of this industry in 2009 (Fig. 2).  A 
significant percentage of the passenger transport’ revenues comes from the domestic 
market that represents the major segment accounting for 80,5% of the 768 million 
passengers transported in 2009. From these total, 50% were transported by the top four 
airlines in terms of number of domestic passengers transported (Fig. 1) while the top ten 
represents 83% of the total passengers. The remaining 19,5% represents the international 
market in which the top ten airlines were responsible by the transportation of 52% of the 
total international segment’ passengers,  being evident the competition of foreign carriers 
in this market (App. 4). 
Figure 1: Top airlines in terms of domestic passengers transported-2009 
 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market data. Percentages calculated by the 
author. 
                                                          
2 Federal Aviation Administration 
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A common productivity’ measure of an airline firm is the revenue passenger miles 
(RPM’s) that can be compared with the available seat miles (ASM’s) in order to calculate 
the overall passenger load factor. In 2009, the top 10 airline with both higher RPM’s and 
ASMs are all major airlines (App. 5) representing 83% and 86% of the total industry’ 
RPM’s and ASM’s respectively. 
Figure 2: Components of the industry’ operating revenue and operating expenses in 2009 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Percentages calculated by the author. 
Besides the passenger transportation, there are other revenue sources in this 
industry namely the freight/cargo transportation that individually accounts for 24% of the 
industry’ operating revenue in 2009 (Fig. 2). In these segment there are airlines leaders 
such as the FedEx and the UPS that exclusively transport cargo however, the passenger 
airlines also compete in this segment but in a small percentage with the top five passenger 
airlines representing only 21% (US DOT and ATA) of the total industry revenue ton mille 
(App. 6)  
Concerning with the expenses, the flying operations expenses, which includes the 
fuel, represent 35% of the total operating expesnses of the industry in 2009 (Fig. 2)  being 
the most significant component. Due the significant percentage of these expenses the 
industry is pretty exposure to fluctuations in the material and supplies prices (IBES 2011). 
Individually, the fuel expenses represents 21% of the total operating expenses of the US 
airlines industry demonstrating the importance of this component in this industry. 
3.1.2. Competition environment  
The US Airlines industry was deregulated in 1978 allowing the entrance of several 
low-cost carriers (LCCs). These airlines with a lower cost structure contributed for a 
higher competition and forced the established network legacy carriers (NLCs) to 
reformulate their strategies in order to maintain their market share (Belobaba et al. 2011). 
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This competition is mainly visible through the fares offered (App. 8) since the LCC’s 
focus more in single flights rather than conduct the passengers through the hubs, the case 
of the NLC’s,  they are more able to reduce the costs achieving a higher margin to practice 
lower fares than the NLC’s (Hüschelrath and Müller 2011). 
In last years, the LCC’s increase their RPM’s and maintains a positive growth 
rates in the domestic market even in crisis periods (e.g. 2008-09 crisis) (Fig.3). Four of 
the major passenger airlines (Appendix 2) are LCC’s being the Southwest the leader in 
terms of number of domestic passengers transported in 2009 (Fig. 1) and the most of top 
airlines in terms of higher operating profit in that year (App. 7) are LCC’s, thus 
demonstrating the penetration of these airlines in the industry. 
Figure 3: RPM for major NWCs and LCCs (2003-2009)3 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market data. 
  In addition, the NLC’s also face a strong competition in the international segment 
from the foreign airlines due the several agreements of “open skies” between the US and 
other regions, as the European Union in 2008. This fact arouses some concerns for the 
US airlines as referred by Continental Airlines (2010): ‘this competition may have a 
material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition or liquidity’. 
Moreover, the codesahring arrangements and international alliances as Star Alliance 
contribute also for the increase of competition from foreign airlines (Delta Airlines 2010). 
3.1.3. Recent trends  
The recent global crisis affected severely the US airline industry in 2008 and 2009 
being the deepest downturn experienced by this industry according with IATA4 (2010). 
                                                          
3 Based on the airlines classified by US DOT as major in 2009 
4 International Air Transport Association  
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The number of passengers transported in 2009 decreased 5,1% relatively to the previous 
year, accentuating the trend already observed in 2008 (Fig. 4) mainly in the domestic 
segment (App. 9)  In order to minimize the impact of the weak passenger demand, the 
airlines reduced the passenger capacity by which there was a decrease of 7,3% in the 
number of enplanements in 2009 (FAA 2010) and a decrease of 5,9% in the ASM’s (App. 
7). However, despite this effort, the industry experienced a decrease of 4,7% in the RPM’s 
in 2009 being the lowest performance of the last six years (App.10). 
Figure 4: Total passengers transported in the US airline industry (2003-2009) 
 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market data. Percentages calculated by author 
As stated by IATA (2010), the airlines industry is a capital intensive industry 
whereby a high asset utilization is the central point in order to decrease the weight of the 
fixed costs. If there is a decrease of the capacity, this means a decrease in the asset 
utilization increasing the weights of fixed costs whereat the airline will try compensate 
this with the increase of the fares. However, the increase of the fares was not viable in 
2009 since the price competition significantly increase in this year leading to a lower price 
level (App. 8) which implicated a non-efficient result from the capacity cuts.  The cargo 
demand also suffered a decline with a drop of $20.2 billion in cargo revenue (ATA 2010) 
mainly due the strong competition and the alternative shipping modes (FAA 2010). 
The fuel costs was the main driver of industry’ costs in 2009. In this year, the fuel 
price decrease significantly when compared with 2008 (App. 11) however, this period 
was characterized by a high volatility of the fuel price ranged from $147 per barrel to $33 
per barrel in only five months (ATA 2010).  
Towards this events, the operating revenue decreased 16,7% in 2009, the deepest 
decrease in the last seven years (Fig. 5). In terms of operating expenses they decreased 
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19,4% in 2009 after having achieved a record level in 2008, mainly drove by the 31,8% 
of reduction of fuel price relatively to the record prices observed in 2008 (FAA 2010).  
          Figure 5: Evolution of the operating revenues and expenses of US airline industry (2003-2009) 
 
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Percentages calculated by author. 
This results allowed the industry airlines to increase their operating profit in 2009 
after having achieved the lowest level of the last four years in 2008 (App. 12). Despite 
this fact, the industry presented a negative net income in 2009 however, with a significant 
improve relatively to 2008 (App. 12). 
3.1.4. General growth perspectives  
For the next years is predicted a gradual recovery of the US and global economy. 
According with the Federal Reserve is estimated a US economy growth between 3% and 
3,5% in 2010 increasing gradually until 2012, point at which it will be grow at a long run 
growth rate of between 2,5% and 2,8%. Consequently, this recovery will be translate also 
in a growth in the US airlines industry which is estimated to growth 22% in the period of 
2009-2014 with an annual growth of 4,1% achieving a total value of $187,3 billion in 
2014 (Datamonitor 2010). 
In terms of passenger demand the FAA (2010) forecast a minor growth in 2010 
with an increase of 0,3% in the RPM’s and an increase of 0,5% in the passengers 
enplanements. According with FAA (2010) this growth will be more significant from 
2011, year in which the RPM’s is estimated to grow 2,6% and the passengers 
enplanements in 2,1%. It estimates that until 2030, the RPM’s will grow at 3,5% a year 
and the passengers enplanements at 2,6%, supported by the US economy recovering and 
the fall of the fares ‘level. 
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 Focusing in the domestic market, the FAA (2010) estimates a decrease of the 
RPM’s in 2010 but a recovery from 2011 with an increase of 2,6% and 3,3% in the RPM’s 
and passengers enplanements respectively due the strengthening of the economy. In terms 
of the international segment is also expected an increase of 3,3% in the numbers of 
passengers in 2010 and from 2011 an annual average growth of 5%. 
Regarding with cargo transportation, the FAA (2010), based in the evolution of 
the US GDP as primary drive, estimates a growth of 3,4% in the RTM’s in 2010 and 4,9% 
in 2011, growing from this year at an average of 5.1% until 2030. 
Concerning with the fuel price as the economic conditions are expected to improve 
it price is also expected to rise. According with IATA (2010) forecasts is expected an 
average oil price of $79 in 2010, increasing with the recovery of the economy however, 
this part of the costs has a significant component of uncertainty. 
3.1.5. M&A trends in the industry 
 The deregulation of the US airline industry in 1978 allow the lifting of several 
operational restrictions and the free competition among the airlines creating also space 
for M&A deals. During the last decade, the US airline industry has experienced a 
restructuring with a significant increase of the number of M&A transactions. A significant 
number of these deals were between regional or small airlines in order to face the 
competition from the major airlines and increase their operations coverage however, other 
trend has become visible: the ‘mega-mergers.  
The ‘mega-mergers’ involve major airlines which have a significant percentage 
of the market, mainly of the domestic market, which incur in M&A deals in order to 
consolidate their position in it. This type of deals lead to a significant concentration of the 
ASM and consequently of the number of passenger transported to a fewer number of 
airlines as was demonstrated in Fig. 1. This fact is also evident in a study conducted by 
Johnston and Ozment (2011) in which is analyzed the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that 
measures the industry concentration and through which they conclude that the 
concentration increased mainly from 2007 until to 2009 standing currently at a medium 
concentration level. 
The merger between the US Airways and the America West in 2005 and the 
merger between Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines in 2008 are the two main ‘mega-
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mergers’ which change the US airline landscape but this type of deals tend to increase as 
be evident with the announcement of the United-Continental Airlines merger, the case 
which is here analyzed. 
3.2. Firms analysis 
3.2.1. United Airlines 
   3.2.1.1. Firm overview 
 The United Airlines is a US major airline established in 1926 whose operations 
focus in the transport of passengers, cargo and mail. In 2009, it was the third largest US 
airline in terms of capitalization (App. 3) and the fifth largest in terms of RPM in the US 
airline industry (App. 5). The United is the main subsidiary of the UAL Corporation 
representing almost the totality of its operations. 
 The airline operates around 3,300 flights per day by the own flights and the 
regional operators under capacity purchase agreements to more than 230 US domestic 
and international destinations from its main hubs: Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco and Washington Dulles airports. In 2009, the United had available 409 aircrafts 
for the mainline operations and 292 aircrafts for regional operations accounting with 
approximately 47,000 employees. 
 In terms of the domestic segment, the United operates around 80 destinations in 
US and Canada concentrating its activity primarily in the previous mentioned airports 
which they use as platforms to conduct the passengers through other United’s flights or 
through regional flights operated in majority by independent regional carriers under 
capacity purchase agreements which complement the airline’ offer. In 2009, the United 
was the fourth largest US airline in domestic’s passengers transported with around 56 
million passengers which represent approximately 9% of the industry total5 (Fig. 1). 
 Regarding with the international market, the United operates around 150 
international destinies including Trans-Atlantic, Latin America and Pacific flights being 
one of the largest international carriers based in United States with around 10 million 
passengers transported in 2009 (App. 4) which represented 7% of the total international’ 
passengers transported in that year. The firm focuses mainly in the integration of domestic 
                                                          
5 This percentage only includes the mainline operations 
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and international routes in order to increase the US territory covered by international 
flights. In addition, the United has numerous codeshare agreements and was one of the 
founders of the Star Alliance in 1997, which contributed to the increase of the firm’ 
penetration in this segment. 
 Finally, in terms of cargo transportation, the airline provide both domestic and 
international services in which around 88% of the cargo’s volume in 2009 is related with 
freight shipments and the remaining with mail transportation, being the airline responsible 
by the transportation of 5% of the total industry’ RTM’s in that year. 
   3.2.1.2. Operating revenues and expenses 
The majority of United’ revenues comes from the passenger transportation which 
accounted for 92% of the total United’s operating revenues in 2009. The passengers 
revenues, measured by the RPM’s, suffered a decrease of 10% in 2009 as compared with 
2008 (App. 17) accentuating the trend already visible since 2007 as consequence of the 
global recession that affected the passenger travel demand (App.16). In order to maximize 
the operations efficiency towards the passenger demand drop, the United realized a 
capacity cut of around 10% in 2009 beyond those already realized in the previous years 
originating  a decrease trend of the RPM’s in last years (App. 17). 
The domestic segment is the one that most contribute for the United’ passenger 
revenues accounting for 65% of it and representing 47% of the total operating revenues 
in 2009 (Fig 6). This segment suffered a decrease of 11% and 21% in 2008 and 2009 
respectively reflecting the global recession effect mentioned above. For its turn, the 
regional operations, which complements the domestic flights, are the second most 
important source of the United’ operating revenues representing 11% of it in 2009. This 
segment also suffered a revenue decrease in 2009 however, of only 1%.  
In the international segment, the United has significant revenues from the Pacific 
and Trans-Atlantic segments that each represented 12% of the total operating revenues in 
2009. These two segments suffered a decrease in its revenues in 2009 being the most 
significant drop in Pacific segment which decreased 29% while the Trans-Atlantic 
segment dropped 18%. 
Beside the passenger transportation, the United also realize cargo transportation 
services however, it only represented 3% of the total operating revenues in 2009 (Fig. 6). 
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Similarly with the other segments, the cargo transportation revenues suffered a drop of 
37% in 2009 as compared with 2008 due the cargo capacity reduction, the lower demand 
and prices as well as the lower fuel surcharges on the cargo shipments.    
Figure 6. Evolution of the United’s operating revenues components (2005-2009) 
 
Source: United’s Annual Reports. Percentages calculated by the author. 
Relatively to operating expenses, the wages and aircraft expenses are the items 
that most contributed to the United’ total operational expenses in last years, representing 
21% and 23% respectively of it in 2009 (Fig. 6). The wages expenses after an increase 
trend in 2006 and 2007 decreased 14% and 12% in next two years respectively, mainly 
drove by the reduction of the workforce and the decrease of the severance expenses. In 
terms of the fuel expense it decreased 56% in 2009 after have increased 81% in 2008 due 
the record fuel’s prices observed in that year (App.20). This fact had a significant impact 
in the regional operations expenses, which includes the fuel expenses of it, by which this 
item is the third most important in the total operating expenses, representing 18% of it in 
2009. 
Figure 7. Evolution of the United’s operating expenses components (2005-2009) 
 
Source: United’s Annual Reports  
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   3.2.1.3 Profitability 
Focusing in the EBITDA, as performance measure, is visible that the United 
presented in 2006 and 2007 a slight increase trend however, this trend was interrupted in 
2008 by the global recession which affected severely the airline’s operations resulting in 
the worst result of the last years (Fig. 8). Regarding with the last year, 2009, is visible 
that the airline recovered in comparison to 2008 demonstrating an increase in its 
profitability however maintaining its EBITDA in a negative level.  
Figure 8. Evolution of the United’s EBITDA and net profit (2005-2009) 
 
Source: United’s Annual Reports.    
A similar trend was presented in terms of net profit which the worst result was 
recorded in 2005 due the airline’ bankruptcy condition, followed by a slight recovery in 
the next two years. The year of 2008 was marked also for a deep negative net profit, 
identically to EBITDA, with a recovery in 2009 which demonstrated an increase in the 
airline’ profitability despite the fact of it be yet negative. Comparing both measures with 
the US airline industry can be state that the United’s followed an identical trend with 
exception for 2009 in which the industry presented a positive EBITDA on contrary of the 
United which demonstrate that the airline was more affected in their operations by the 
global recession than the industry overall (App. 12). 
   3.2.1.4. Liquidity 
The United presented a current ratio always below 1 in the period of 2005-2009 
(Fig. 9 (a)) which demonstrated that the firm can be unable of pay off its obligations if 
they came due once it’s current assets are lower that it’s current liabilities. The lower 
current ratio was recorded in 2008, reflecting the firm’s difficulties due the global 
recession, being observed a slight improvement in 2009. In terms of quick ratio, the airline 
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presented the same trend (Fig. 9 (a)) which demonstrated that the firm has more current 
liabilities than liquid assets that can be used as primary source to pay it. Comparing with 
the ratios of the US airline industry is visible that the United was in line with its industry 
in the period of 2005-2007, however in last two years it presented lower ratios 
demonstrating a lower liquidity. 
Figure 9. Evolution of United’s current ratios, quick ratios and Net Working Capital (2005-2009) 
(a)          (b) 
Source: United’s Annual Reports.  Ratios calculated by the author. 
In terms of net working capital, the United presented negative results in the entire 
analyzed period (Fig. 9 (b)) which confirm the conclusions taken in the previous ratios of 
the disproportional quantity of current assets in relationship to the current liabilities. 
   3.2.1.5. Assets and equity 
The United’s return on assets (ROA) achieve their lower level in 2005 due the 
airline’s bankruptcy condition mentioned above and which evidenced the decrease of the 
firm’s capacity to use its assets to generate earnings. In the following two years, the airline 
recovered by which presented a positive ROA despite being very close of 0% in 2007. 
This trend was interrupted in 2008, year in which the airline presented the worst ROA 
since 2005 due the effects of the global recession on its operations, but being reverted in 
part during 2009 in which the return was -3%. This trend was similar to the one observed 
in the US airline industry being the negatives returns in 2005 and 2008 more pronounced 





Figure 10. Evolution of United’s return on assets and return on equity (2005-2009) 
(a)         (b) 
Source: United’s Annual Reports.  Returns calculated by the author. 
 Concerning with United’s return on equity (ROE), the airline presented the lowest 
return in 2008, around of -11,000% (Fig 10 (b)) representing the worst year in terms of 
returns for the shareholders which reflected the significant impact of the global recession 
in the airline operations. In 2009, this return increase to 25% meaning a positive return 
for the shareholder due the improvement of the net income but yet negative which with 
the total shareholders’ equity negative implied a positive return. 
   3.2.1.6. Debt 
The United had an average debt ratio of 34% in the period of 2005- 2009 (Fig. 
1a.), being slightly high than the industry average that was in 30% (App. 15). The main 
increase happened in 2006 in which the airline achieved a ratio of 41% compared with 
the 7% of 2005, due the raise in debt to financing the firm’s exit of the bankruptcy and 
follow their reorganization plan. Since 2007, the firm had presented a debt ratio with a 
moderate increase trend standing in 46% in 2009. In this year, the airline presented a total 
debt of $8,543 in which $7,572 are long term debt incurred for the acquisition of aircrafts 
and equipment’s in previous years and long-term obligations in operating leases. 
Figure 11. Evolution of United’s debt ratio and debt to equity ratio (2005-2009) 
(a)                            (b) 
Source: United’s Annual Reports  
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Relatively to the debt-to-equity ratio, the airline had presented a significant 
volatility in it in the period 2005-2009 (Fig. 11 (b)). The highest ratios were achieved in 
2006 and 2007 mainly drove by the increase of debt mentioned above. However, in the 
following two years the ratios drop for a negative level due the presented negative total 
shareholders’ equities which were affected by the retained losses and the decrease in the 
shareholder’s investments contracting the industry average in this period (App. 15). 
   3.2.1.7. Capital Expenditures 
In last years, the United’s capital expenditures are primarily related with cash 
expenditures for property, equipment and software. The airline focused their investments 
mainly in acquisition of new aircrafts as well as in the acquisitions of aircrafts that were 
under operating leases’ contracts, in the portion that are not financed by debt. 
Analyzing the last five years (Fig. 12), is visible that 2007 was the year in which 
the airline presented a higher level of capital expenditures due mainly the acquisitions of 
several aircrafts. However, due the hard economic environment lived in the following two 
years, the airline reduced their capital expenditure level with the goal of optimize its 
available cash. Despite this situation, the airline has several capital commitments that will 
influence the future capital expenditures independently of the economic situation namely 
aircrafts enhancements. 
Figure 12. Evolution of the United’s capital expenditures (2005-2009) 
 
Source: United’s Annual Reports  
   3.2.1.8. Stock performance 
 The UAL common stock are traded in the NASDAQ market under the symbol 
‘UAUA’ having approximately 1,426 holders of its common stock at February 15, 2010 
which correspond to 167,610,620 outstanding shares. Due the reorganization plan, 
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mentioned before, the firm canceled the old common stock and issued up to 125,000,000 
shares of new common stock which began to trade in the market at beginning of 2006. 
 Relatively to the shares performance, they achieved the highest price at the 
beginning of 2007 (Fig. 13), around $51 per share, remaining its price always above the 
$30 until the end of the year. However, during 2008, the shares prices dropped until $3 
per share which reflected the negative impact of the global recession in the airline’ results 
and in the industry in general by the reduction of the passenger demand and the increase 
of the fuel prices. The year 2009 started with the same trend observed in the previous 
year, but at the end of this year the shares prices recovered slightly, worth around $13 at 
31st December, due the signs of a recovery of the market conditions. Comparing the UAL 
stock performance with the S&P 500 index can be stated that from 2008 both recorded a 
similar trend. 











Source: Bloomberg  
3.2.2. Continental Airlines 
3.2.2.1.  Firm overview 
Continental Airlines is a US major airline established in 1934 being in 2009, the 
US’ fourth largest airline in terms of RPM (App. 5) and the fourth US largest airline in 
terms of market capitalization (App. 3).  It’s operations focus on the transportation of 
passengers, cargo and mail operating not only own flights but also regional flights under 
capacity purchase agreements with other airlines and a wholly-owned subsidiary, the 
Continental Micronesia. It provides around to 2,000 daily departures having in 2009 
flights to 118 domestic and 124 international destinations including Trans-Atlantic, 
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Pacific and South America destinations. At this time, the airline accounted with 337 
mainline jets and 264 regional aircrafts and a total of 39,640 employees. 
Regarding the domestic operations, the airline operates their routes mainly through 
the hubs of the Newark, Houston and Cleveland airports, thus concentrating their activity 
in large population centers in order to provide a large number of connections with other 
cities. Additionally, the regional operators under capacity purchase agreements offers 
flights to US destinations to complement the Continental ‘offer and at the same time 
realize short-distance flights in which Continental using their aircrafts would not be 
profitable. According with airline’ information, Continental was responsible for 75%, 
84% and 65% of the average daily departures of the Newark, Houston and Cleveland 
airports respectively in 20096. In this year, it was responsible by the transportation of 10% 
of total passengers in the domestic market7 representing around 63 million passengers 
(App. 21). 
In terms of international operations, the airline also concentrates their activities 
mostly in the previous hubs and in the Guam being the main gateways for international 
destinies. According with Continental’ information, 51% of the airline’ mainline 
operations (in terms of ASM) was committed with international services being the third 
US airline with more passengers transported to international destinies (App. 4). In order 
to extend their offer in the international segment, the airline has several codeshares 
agreements with foreign airlines and became a Star Alliance’ member in 2009.  
Continental Airlines also provides services of cargo’ transportation in the domestic 
and international segments. It was responsible for 3% of the total RTM’s of the US airline 
industry in 2009 (App. 6). 
3.2.2.2. Operational revenues and expenses 
The major percentage of the Continental’s operating revenue comes from the 
passenger ‘transport that accounted for 88,5% of the total operating revenues in 2009 
while the cargo transportation, the second most important revenues ‘component, only 
accounted with 2,9%. The passenger ‘revenues suffered a decreased of around 18,9% in 
2009 relatively to 2008 after a constant increase trend observed since 2005 (App. 23). 
                                                          
6 These percentages include the mainline and regional operations. 




This reflected the impact of the global recession which implied a decreased of passenger’ 
demand (App. 21) namely of the business passenger segment, the highest yield segment, 
and the low fares. This can be stated also by the evolution of the Continental’s RPM that 
suffered a decrease in 2008 and 2009 as well as in terms of ASM that decreased 5,2% in 
2009 due the cuts in the total capacity in order to minimize the lower demand (App. 21). 
The domestic segment is the one that most contributes for the passenger revenues 
accounting for 36,4% of the total operating revenue in 2009. In the international segment 
can be highlighted the Trans-Atlantic and Latin America flights that represent 17,9% and 
11,8% respectively of the operation revenue of that year. Additionally, the regional 
operations contributed for 15,1% of the operational revenue, thus demonstrating once 
more the importance of the domestic market (Fig. 14).  
Figure 14. Evolution of the Continental’s operating revenue components (2005-2009) 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports  
All of these segments suffered a significant decrease in 2009 namely the domestic 
segment that saw their revenues decrease 18,7%, the Trans-Atlantic segment that 
decreased 24,6% and the regional operations which decreases of 19,6% (App. 23). In 
terms of cargo revenues they suffered also a decrease of 26% in 2009 relatively to 2008 
(App. 23) that according with the airlines is related primarily due the decrease in the cargo 
volume and the lower fuel surcharge rates. 
Concerning with operating expenses, the fuel and wages are the components that 
most contributes for it (Fig. 15) representing 51% of the total operating expenses in 2009. 
The fuel costs increased since 2005 however, in 2009 this cost dropped in 32,3% (App. 
25) due the lower level of the jet fuel price that decreased from $3,27 in 2008 to $1,97 in 
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2009 per gallon8. Relatively to the wages costs they increased 6% in 2009 after a decrease 
in 2008, being this costs strictly correlated with the level of collective bargain power 
demonstrated by the number of employees represented by unions which in 2009 was 97%. 
Figure 15. Evolution of the Continental’s operating expenses components (2005-2009) 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports 
3.2.2.3. Profitability 
A key performance ‘measure is the EBITDA which after two years of growth trend, 
it dropped drastically in 2008 with a decrease of around 145% due primarily the record 
fuel prices observed in that year (App. 25). In 2009, the trend improved but remained 
negative due the decrease in the operational revenues that was attenuated by the lower 
level of fuel prices (Fig. 16).  
Figure 16. Evolution of the Continental’s EBITDA and net profit (2005-2009) 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports 
                                                          
8 Average consolidated of the airline 
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In terms of net profit, they followed the same trend of the EBITDA with a 
significant drop in 2008 of around 175% and a recovery in 2009 but still remaining in a 
negative level (Fig. 16) mainly drove by the previous mentioned factors. Through this 
results can be stated that Continental saw their profitability fall in last periods reflecting 
the global recession however, is already visible a slight recovery trend. 
3.2.2.4. Liquidity 
The Continental’ current ratio decreased in 2007 and 2008 which meant a decrease 
in the firm ‘ability of pay the short-term obligations and a reduction of it liquidity. 
However, in 2009 was visible a slight recovery achieving a current ratio of 0,9964. 
Despite this event, Continental presented between 2005 and 2009 a higher ratio than the 
industry one (App. 13) which had an average value of 0,8544 in this period. Regarding 
with quick ratio was observed the same trend of the current ratio with a decrease in the 
firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligation with the most liquid assets in 2007-2008. 
Figure 17. Evolution of Continental’s current ratios, quick ratios and Net Working Capital (2005-
2009) 
(a)            (b) 
Source: Continental’s Annual Reports 
 In terms of Net Working Capital (NWC) it suffered a drop of around 213% in 
2008 reflecting a decrease in the firm ‘ability to pay its current liabilities due mainly the 
global recession that, as mentioned previously, affected the Continental’s operations. 
Keeping the same trend of the previous liquidity indicators, the NWC situation improved 




3.2.2.5. Assets and equity 
The Continental’ return on assets (ROA) had a decrease trend since 2006 with the 
lowest returns observed in 2008 with -5% and 2009 with -2% (Fig. 18 (a)). Before this 
results, it is visible that the firm’s ability to use its assets to create profit decrease in this 
period as can be stated by the net profits observed in the last two years that was affected 
by the revenue ‘decrease and instability of fuel prices.  This evolution follows the overall 
trend of the US industry airline (App. 14) that was deeply affected by the previous factors. 
Figure 18. Evolution of Continental’s return on assets and return on equity (2005-2009) 
(a)            (b) 
Source: Continental’s Annual Reports 
 Following the same trend, the return on equity (ROE) suffered a decline trend 
since 2006 being also 2008 and 2009 the years with worst performance relatively to this 
measure with -70% and -79% respectively (Fig. 18 (a)), thus reflecting the deterioration 
of the firm’s ability in generate return to the shareholders mainly drove by the factors 
above mentioned which affected all the industry (App.14). 
3.2.2.6. Debt 
Continental presented a relatively stable debt ratio between 2005 and 2009 with an 
average ratio of 48%, higher than the 30% average debt ratio observed in the industry in 
this period (App. 15). The lowest debt ratio was observed in 2007 with 41% being 
observed a moderate increase trend after this year until achieve a ratio of around 50% in 
2009 (Fig. 18 (b)). In this year, the debt totaled $6,266 million in a total assets of $12,788 
million. From the total debt value, $5,291 million are related with long-term debt and 
capital leases which were primarily incurred to purchase or lease facilities or equipment, 
mainly aircrafts, to run the firm activity.  
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Figure 19. Evolution of Continental’s debt ratio and debt to equity ratio (2005-2009) 
(a)       (b) 
Source: Continental’s Annual Reports 
Regarding with debt-to-equity ratio, the airline presented a quite high ratio in the 
period between 2005 and 2009. The most critical year was 2008 in which the firm 
presented a debt-to-equity ratio of more 5000% (Fig. x), being evident that the firm relies 
more in financing external sources than in financing from the shareholders. This trend 
also was observable in the US airline industry, however in a lower proportion with an 
average debt-to-equity ratio of 134% in the period 2005-2009 (App. X). Once more is 
evident the importance of debt in order to get the needed funds to realize the required 
investments. 
3.2.2.7. Capital Expenditures 
The Continental’s capital expenditures basically can be classified in fleet and non-
fleet expenditures which represent the majority of this expenditures (App. 26). The fleet 
expenditures consisted mostly in aircraft acquisitions (the share of the total acquisition 
cost that is not cover by financing), in acquisition of flight simulators and training 
equipment as well as capital expenditures incurred to improve the passenger travel’ 
condition (e.g. entertainment systems). In terms of non –fleet expenditure they are mostly 
related with ground support equipment and terminal improvements. Beside of these two 
main components, a small percentage is related with the rotable parts that are restored. 
The capital expenditures increased significantly until to 2008 (Fig. 20) suffering a 
substantial decrease of around 24% in 2009 thus reflecting the hard economic 
environment. The economic condition is the main driver of the capital expenditures as 
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stated by the firm, however exists commitments taken by it, namely acquisition of 
aircrafts, which cannot be easily reverted thus influencing the future capital expenditures. 
Figure 20. Evolution of the Continental’s capital expenditures (2005-2009) 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports  
3.2.2.8. Stock performance  
The Continental’s shares are traded in the NYSE with the symbol ‘CAL’ having 
around 18,890 holders of its common stocks at February 16, 2010 with 123,264,534 
outstanding shares. Analyzing its stock’ performance in last five years (Fig. 21) it is 
visible a decrease trend in its price since 2007. The highest price was achieved in 2007, 
around $51 per share however, since this year Continental’s saw their stock price drop 
drastically achieving a price of around $7 during 2008 and 2009 due the negative impact 
of the global recession on the firm’s operations. At the end of 2009 was already visible a 
slight recovery trend with the share price in around $18, mainly drove by the signs of 
improvement of Continental’s results and by the news about the merger with the United 
Airlines. Comparing with the S&P 500 index performance is visible that both followed a 
similar trend namely from 2008 reflecting the crisis ‘impact (Fig. 21). 












Source: Bloomberg  
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4. Firms’ valuation as standalone 
 The United and Continental Airlines are both US major airlines with similar 
dimensions and which, as analyzed previously, serve the same geographic segments. This 
leads to the fact of both have the main performance drivers and are exposed to the same 
market conditions and risks. For these reasons, the assumptions and indicators taken in 
consideration are identical for both companies in order to calculate the components of 
their free cash flow (equation 2.6) which are described in the following sections and 
which are also present in the forecast balance sheet and income statement of each airline 
(App. 30-47). 
4.1. Operating revenues 
The airline industry is cyclical by which the economic conditions have a 
significant impact in the passenger demand and consequently plays an important role in 
the determination of the revenues. For this reason it is extremely important to take in 
consideration the economic projections in order to estimate the revenues in the most 
reliable way.   
For the current analysis and taking in account the above mentioned aspect, the 
estimation of United and Continental’s revenues for the next years is based in the FAA’s 
RPM projections (App. 29). The FAA projected the RPM’s growth for each of the 
geographic segments served by the US airlines taking in account the economic 
environment in each of these regions.  As the RPM is the basic productivity measure of 
an airline company that take in account the evolution of the passenger traffic and the 
capacity available, it is the most suitable proxy for revenues performance by which their 
growth rates are applied to estimate them. For this analysis is assumed that both firms 
will maintain its market share of 2009 and as major airlines will follow the growth trend 
of the industry. 
The year of 2008 and 2009 represented a significant downturn in the industry, as 
stated in previous sections, however the recent projections indicate a slight recovery that 
will start in 2010 but this recovery is more significant in determined regions than others 
by which in order to estimate the revenue growth in following years it is applied to each 
region the respective projected growth rate (App. 27-28). 
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The domestic operations, the most important source of revenues for both airlines, 
is assumed that it will suffer a slight decline of -0,2% in its revenues in 2010, trend also 
visible in the Trans-Atlantic operations but in a more significant way, around of 2%. This 
is mainly due the slow recovery of US and European economies that were the most 
affected economies by the recession whereat is assumed that in these economies will 
remain the tight credit and consequently a lower consumer spending. This trend will be 
reversed from 2011, year in which the economic recovery is expected to become more 
pronounced with the US GDP growth between 3,4% to 4,5% according with the Federal 
Reserve projections (App. 27), and the Europe, Africa and Middle East GDP in around 
2% of growth according with FAA and Global Insight Inc. estimations (App.28). Taking 
in account this estimations is predicted a revenue growth of 1,5% and 5,2% in the 
domestic and Trans-Atlantic operations respectively in 2011. In 2012, the US domestic 
operations is predicted to achieve a revenue growth of 4,1% while the Trans-Atlantic 
operations revenue is expected to growth 4,7%, being this year the point in time that is 
expected that the respective growth rates will slowly start to stabilize achieving a growth 
rate of 3% and 3,8% in the US domestic and Trans-Atlantic operations respectively in 
2017.  
Regarding with the Latin America segment is estimated a growth rate of 3,5% in 
2010 follow by a period of significant growth until 2014, year in which is expected a 
revenue growth of 5,9%. This projections are mainly driven by the expected stronger 
economy growth in this region that were less affected by the world recession, their GDP 
in the period analyzed is expected to grow at an average of 4% per annum. From 2014, 
the revenues from this segment is expected to decrease but in a slight way, staying at 
5,5% in 2017. In the other international segment, the Pacific, the estimations appointed 
for a growth rate of 1,3% in 2010 follow by a period of significant growth due also the 
expected growth of the economies in this region which average GDP growth rate is of 5% 
until 2015, year in each this segment is predict to grow around 5,8% . Similar to the others 
segments, it also suffer a slight decrease in their growth but maintaining in a high level 
with a growth rate of 5,6% in 2017 reflecting once again the economic conditions of the 
countries in this region.   
Concerning with the regional operations is assumed a growth rate of 3,9% in 2010. 
Despite of the hard economic environment, the slight recovery of the US economy which 
GDP is expected to growth around 3,2% in this year and taking in account the trend of 
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the last years in which the regional operators demonstrated a better performance than the 
mainline airlines, it is expected a significant recovery from these operators which taken 
advantage with the agreements with the mainline carriers. These airlines can provide 
flights in an efficiently way for several destinies that for the major airlines such as United 
and Continental are not whereat they can increase their profitability by realizing 
partnerships with these airlines. Similar to the domestic operations, it will growth in a 
more notable way until 2012, year in which the segment is predicted to grow 5,8%. From 
this year it will start to grow at a moderate rate achieving a rate of 4,2% in 2017 following 
the trend of  US national economic conditions. 
In terms of cargo transportation is assumed that their performance are primarily 
tied with the US economy growth, which are the main market served by both airlines. In 
this segment are used as proxy for the future revenue performance, the RTM’s that as 
similar to RPM’s take in account the capacity as well as the quantity of cargo expected to 
transport. Before the economic perspectives, the projections also take in account several 
aspects such as the alternatives and substitutes for air cargo, the competition from the all-
cargo air carriers and the estimations for the air fuel surcharges. From that, it is expected 
a growth in this segment of 3,1% in 2010, which is in line with the economy growth, 
followed by a period of more substantial growth until 2012 in which achieve a growth 
rate of 5,4% and decreasing after this year until a growth rate of 4,6% in 2017. Finally, 
the other revenues as include revenues strictly linked with the performance of all 
segments such as baggage fees or cancellation fees, is assumed an average rate of the 
growth rates applied to the others segments. 
4.2. Operating expenses 
 Concerning with the operating expenses (App. 36 and 45), the jet fuel costs 
represent the component which have more uncertainty relatively to its estimation. During 
the last years the jet fuel price was very volatile achieving record prices in 2008 follow 
by an abrupt fall during 2009, as mentioned in previous sections. Due its significant 
weight in the operating costs of both airlines is crucial to take special attention in this 
item.  
For the fuel costs estimation is also used the FAA’s projections that assume a 
constant growth of its price during the next years taking in account the economic 
projections. As both airlines realize fuel contracts hedging over a part of the estimated 
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fuel consumed is taken in account a reduction of 0,5% in the estimated growth rate of jet 
fuel cost in order to reflect the possible gains from this contracts inferred by the gains in 
last years.  Before this, for the year of 2010 and 2011 is expected a fuel price increase of 
around 4,5% being expected a more significant increase in 2012 with an increase of 6,8%. 
From this year the growth rate tend to stabilize around 2% per annum until 2017 in which 
is expected an increase of 0,9%.  
In order to calculate the total jet fuel cost is also analyzed the total volume of jet 
fuel expected to consume based in the amount reported by the airlines in 2009. For 2010, 
is assumed a decrease of 0,5% and 2% in the total fuel consumed from United and 
Continental respectively reflecting the recent trend of capacity reduction to face the lower 
passenger demand, trend that is expected to be reversed in 2011 and follow years with an 
increase between 1% and 2% per annum to answer to the increasing passenger demand. 
Regarding with the wages and salaries expenses is assumed that they are primarily 
driven by the evolution of the US inflation rate being the estimation based in the 
predictions of the Federal Reserve (App. 27). However, both airlines, as showed 
previously, have a significant percentage of the employees represented by unions which 
increase their bargaining power and the possibility of higher costs in the future by which 
is added to the expected inflation rate an average margin of 1% to reflect this situation. 
Relatively to the regional purchase expenses, its estimation is based in the regional 
operations revenues, since these expenses are all related with the agreements with the 
regional operators. In 2010 is assumed that the weight of this expenses in the total regional 
operations revenues slightly decrease in order to take in account the reduction of costs 
that are predicted by both airlines, growing at the regional revenues rate. However, in the 
follow years is assumed that the weight of these costs will increase until the weight 
average of the previous 5 years that was 95% and 45% to the United and Continental 
respectively in order to reflect the segment recovery described above. Other specific case 
is the aircraft rentals expenses that are estimated based in the current obligations of each 
airline concerning with operational leasing related with aircrafts which translates in the 
rentals payments expenses.  
All the others estimated operating expenses that include the landing fees, 
passenger services/purchased services, distribution expenses and maintenance are 
estimated based in the total operational revenues since all of these expenses are primarily 
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tied with the level of passenger demand and the number of flights. Taking in account a 
slight reduction of some costs for both airlines in 2010 is also estimated from this year an 
increase of their respective weights in the total operational revenues until their average 
weighted of the last 5 years in order to reflect the economy recovery and consequently 
the increase of number of passenger and flights. 
4.3. Capital expenditures and depreciation 
 The airline industry is capital intensive by which the airlines need to realize 
substantial investments in fixed assets by purchasing new aircraft and equipment and 
improve the condition of the current ones to run their activity. Following the finance 
literature, the capital expenditures is estimated as percentage of the total operating 
revenues since it demonstrates the evolution of the firm’s activity and reflects the ability 
and the timing for new investments. 
 In 2009, the capital expenditures represented 1,9% and 3% of the operating 
revenues of United and Continental respectively (App. 32 and 41). Due the hard economic 
conditions and the low passenger demand is estimated for 2010 an equal weight of this 
expenditures for both airlines increasing only in the growth rate of the operating revenues. 
However, as mentioned in the firm’s analysis both firms have future capital commitments 
namely the Continental that has contracts about new aircrafts that will be delivered from 
2011 to 2016. In order to reflect this situation, the weights in both airlines are estimated 
to increase gradually until achieve a weight of 4% and 4,5% of the total revenues of 
United and Continental respectively in 2017. These rates reflect an additional margin of 
1% over the historical weight averages in order to take in account the estimated value of 
this investments and other possible future capital requirements. 
 In terms of depreciation and amortization is estimated according with the weight 
that they had in the total of amount of property and plant (PP&E) in the historical period. 
Both airlines presented a relative constant rate of depreciation in the historical period by 
which it’s assumed a constant weight of 6% and 6,5% of the PP&E of the United and 
Continental respectively. 
4.4. Working capital 
 In order to calculate the net working capital (App. 31 and 40) for both airlines and 
following the finance literature is excluded from the current assets and liabilities the 
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nonoperating items, namely the cash and equivalents, short-term investments and the 
short-term debt. So, for the net working capital calculations is only considered the 
respective accounts receivables, accounts payables, inventories, air traffic liabilities and 
other currents assets and liabilities that according with the airlines’ reports are related 
with their operating activity. 
 Regarding with the accounts receivables, accounts payables and inventory 
estimations is used the respective outstanding days. For these calculations is used the 
credit sales, the inventory account and the cost of goods sold which is assumed to be all 
operating expenses (excluding the depreciation and amortization and distribution costs) 
since to sell a flight ticker the airline needs to incur in all expenses discriminated. For 
these three items is assumed that in the analyzed period their outstanding days will 
converge for the average observed in the historical period. A similar approach is applied 
to the air traffic liabilities and other current assets and liabilities but using as base their 
percentage in the total operating revenues in the case of the assets and in the total 
operating expenses in the case of liabilities. 
4.5. Valuation output 
The free cash flows are predicted for a period of 8 years once analyzing the 
revenues forecasts can be stated that in 2017 they will already growth at a stabilize rate 
when compared with the previous years. After defining the free cash flows was conducted 
a valuation of both airlines through three methods: the Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
(FCFF), the Adjusted Present Value (APV) and the multiple approach, in order to 
compare and assess the feasibility of results obtained. In the following sections is 
explained the assumptions taken in each of one of this methods for both airlines. 
4.5.1. Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) 
In the FCFF method (App. 37 and 46), the free cash flows are discounted at the 
weighted average of cost of capital (WACC) which has as inputs the after-tax cost of 
debt, the cost of equity and the debt-to-value ratio of the firm. 
The cost of equity is calculated through the CAPM approach using the equation 
2.3., which has as inputs the risk free rate, the market risk premium and the beta. 
Following the finance literature, the US 10 years government bond yield is used as the 
risk free rate being assumed a rate of 3,84% which was observed at December 31, 2009. 
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In terms of market risk premium is assumed a rate of 5,5% which was the average rate 
used by US analysts in 2009 according with a survey conducted by Férnandez (2011). 
Concerning to betas it’s assumed the adjusted betas calculated by Bloomberg at 
December 31, 2009 which take in account the respective stock and S&P 500 index 
performance of the last five years. At this time, the United’s beta is 1,977 and the 
Continental’s beta is 1,511. With this data, the United’ cost of equity is estimated to be 
15,7% while the Continental’s cost of equity is estimated to be 12,2%. 
The capital intensive nature of the airline industry lead their firms to use more 
debt than equity to sustaining their operations scale by which presents high debt-to-value 
ratios. In 2009, according with data provided by DOT, the industry presented a debt-to-
value ratio of around 73% while the United presented a ratio of 80% and Continental a 
ratio of 72% (by using market values) being evident that they are consistent with their 
industry. Before this fact, it is assumed that their ratios will be maintained unchangeable 
through the issue of new debt every year at the same amount of debt (including capital 
leases) that will be due (it is assuming that the new debt will be constantly amortized over 
the follow 15 years). Relatively to the cost of debt, as both airlines have a rating of B-, it 
is assumed a spread of 5,2% (Damodaran 2011) over the risk-free rate giving a total cost 
of debt of 9,04%. 
Regarding with the tax rate is assumed a rate of 37% for both airlines. By 
analyzing the effective rate paid by each airline in the historical period is evident that they 
differ considerably from the federal tax rate of 35% mainly due the use of previous net 
operating losses (NOL’s) which reduce the effective tax rate. However, due the 
uncertainty in the estimation of these future tax reductions is assumed the federal tax rate 
of 35% plus a rate of 2% which reflects the average state tax rate paid in the last years 
from both firms. When applied this tax rate over the debt cost is achieved an after-tax cost 
of 5,92%.  
With all the previous inputs is estimated a WACC of 7,72% for United and 7,53% 
for Continental which are used to discount the free-cash flows until 2017. In order to 
calculate the terminal value for the period beyond 2017, it is assumed a growth rate of 
2,5% which corresponds to the Federal Reserve estimation for US GDP long-term growth 
at this time. This rate is the most suitable to assume as growth rate for the perpetuity since 
the airline industry is cyclical and both firms have their main operations in US market. 
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Considering the discounted free cash-flows of the explicit period and the terminal 
value is estimated a total enterprise value of $8,702 million and $7,335 million for United 
and Continental respectively. By subtracting the net debt is achieved an equity value of 
$2,324 million for the United and $2,237 million for Continental which translate in a 
value per share of $13,83 and $18,19 respectively. 
4.5.2. Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
As referred in the literature review, the APV (App. 46 and 47) breakdown the 
enterprise value in order to measure the impact of each of the components of the capital 
structure. The first component of the APV is the calculation of the enterprise value as 
they are totally equity financed, by which is need to estimate the unlevered cost of equity 
to discount the free-cash flows. Following Koller et al. (2010) the most adequate way to 
calculate the unlevered cost of equity is through the equation 4.1 since both airlines will 
manage their debt-to-value ratio to keep them in the target level.  
𝑘𝑒 =  𝑘𝑢 +  
𝐷
𝐸
(𝑘𝑢 − 𝑘𝑑) 
In order to estimate the unlevered cost of equity through the previous equations is 
used the cost of debt (𝑘𝑑) of 9,04%, the respective levered cost of equity calculated 
through the CAPM in the previous section and the debt-to-equity ratio that is 3,95 in the 
case of the United and 2,52 in the case of Continental. From that are estimated an 
unlevered cost of equity of 10,15% and 9,90% for United and Continental respectively 
which give an total all-equity enterprise value, including the terminal value, of $5,617 
million in the case of United and $5,032 in the case of Continental. 
The second component of the APV is the calculation of the expected tax benefits 
over the debt which is a function of the corporate tax rate of 37% and discounted at the 
cost of debt of 9,04%. In terms of terminal value of the interest tax shield (ITS) is assumed 
that it is the difference between the terminal value of the levered and the unlevered firm, 
which according with Holthausen and Zmikewski (2014) reflect the benefits which arise 
from the tax shield in the perpetuity. The total estimated amount of interest tax shield, 
including the terminal value, totalize $3,526 million and $2,699 million in the case of 




The third and last step is the estimation of the expected bankruptcy costs taken in 
account the probability of firm’s default and the expected direct and indirect costs of this 
situation. As both airlines have an corporate rating of B- according with the Standard’s 
& Poor’s (S&P) (2011) the probability of default for this level is 39,41% in 2009 being 
assumed this probability for both airlines. Relatively to the bankruptcy costs, according 
with Thoburn (2000) the bankruptcy direct costs are typically between 1% and 10% of 
the enterprise value while the bankruptcy indirect costs, according with Bris et al. (2006), 
are between 10% and 20% of the enterprise value. Beside this, it is assumed an average 
bankruptcy cost of 20% of the unlevered firm value for both airlines. Taken in account 
this information is estimated a bankruptcy cost of $443 million and $397 million for the 
United and Continental respectively which will be subtracted of the two previous 
components. 
 The estimated United’ equity value through this method is $2,322 million while 
the estimated Continental’s equity value is $2,237 million which translates in a price share 
of $13,82 and $18,18 respectively being these results extremely close of the prices 
obtained in the FCFF. 
4.5.3. Multiple Valuation  
 In order to assess the feasibility of the previous results is also conducted a multiple 
valuation of both airlines in order to analyze if they are fairly priced relative to 
comparable firms which form their peer group. The peer group is formed by listed global 
major airlines (Fig. 22), usually known as flag carriers, which serve the same markets 
segments served by both United and Continental. This set of airlines, as global carriers 
with a similar range of destinations, face the same market conditions and risks as well as 
similar growth prospective, whereby they constitute a good benchmark for the airlines 
analyzed. Beside these facts also is considered the ROIC prospective for each of one of 
the airlines in order to maintain the consistency.  
 According with Ferris and Petitt (2013) the enterprise value multiples are the most 
popular and used in the M&A transactions since reflect both the debt and equity. 
Following this, were conducted a multiples analyses of both airlines using the most 
popular enterprise multiples: the EV/EBITDA, the EV/EBIT and the EV/Sales multiples 
being the first one the most cited in the finance literature as appropriated to M&A 
transactions. Taken in account the peer group established, the multiples range from1,34 
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times to 14,98 times the EBITDA, from -32,48 times to 18,74 times the EBIT and from 
0,06 times to 1,21 times the sales. 
 Focusing in the EV/EBITDA multiple, by multiplying the estimated United’s 
EBITDA of $469 million and the Continental’s EBITDA of $380 million with the 
median, of the multiple is achieved a value per share of $14,26 and $18,31 for United and 
Continental respectively which are relatively close and in line with the results obtained 
in the previous methods thus confirming the feasibility of the analysis. Even when are 
deleted the all the outliers such as the multiple of 1,34 or 14,98, the value per share remain 
around of these values. 
Figure 22. Peer group of United and Continental Airlines 
 
Source of data: Bloomberg and airline’s reports 
 Relatively to EV/EBIT multiple its results cannot be take in account since the 
EBIT forecast for both airlines to 2010 are negative which will not give a feasible 
valuation. Concerning with the EV/Sales multiple it presents discrepant values from the 
ones achieved in the other methods as well as in the EV/EBITDA multiple. According 
with this multiple the United’ per share price is $44,84 while the Continental’s price per 
share is $56,92. However, this multiple by focusing only in a specific item, the sales, can 
significantly distort the enterprise value by which cannot be adequate to valuate a firm in 
a specific industry such as the airline industry which is cyclical. From that, the 
EV/EBITDA multiple is the most acceptable multiple for the case here analyzed.  
4.5.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
 A sensitivity analysis is conducted in order to analyze the impact on the target 
price of possible changes in some valuation components. For this purpose is analyzed the 
change in four components: the operating revenues, the operating costs, the WACC and 
the growth rate.  
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As cyclical industry, the operating revenues are strictly correlated with the 
economic conditions by which is important to measure the impact of a change in it due a 
better or worst economic environment. An equal reason is also applied to the analysis of 
the operating costs since both airlines have cost ‘components with a significant weight 
and which volatility can be high due the economic environment, namely the fuel costs. It 
is also important to analyze the impact of changes in WACC since it is the rate by which 
is discounted the free-cash flows having impact in the total enterprise value calculated. 
Finally, it is also analyzed the growth rate assumed in terminal value since it has a 
significant weight in the total enterprise value. 
The Fig. 23 show basically four scenarios in order to reflect an optimistic, a very 
optimistic, a pessimist and very pessimist scenario for a conjunction of changes in 
operating revenues and expenses (Fig.23 (a)) and for a conjunction of changes in the 
WACC and the growth rate (Fig.23 (b)). 
Figure 23. United and Continental’ sensitivity analysis 
  (a)                            (b) 
 
Regarding with United Airlines, from the analysis of the Fig 23. (a) which 
approach changes in both operating revenues and expenses, is visible that the price per 
share range between $1,29 in a case of a very pessimistic scenario and $18,28, in a very 
optimistic scenario being an evidence of a significant dispersion for the intervals 
analyzed. The values highlighted in the squares are the values that are closer to the target 
price achieved in the previous sections which corresponds to scenarios in which both 
revenues and costs move in the same direction. Regarding with the prices achieved in the 
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pessimist and very pessimist scenarios (the ones in which there is a decrease in the 
operating revenues and increase of the operating costs) they are below of the United’s 
share price observed in 31st December, 2009 which was around of $12,91. The opposite 
happens with the optimistic and very optimistic scenarios. In the case of Continental 
Airlines, the range is between $4,59 and $31,78 which similar to United show a 
significant dispersion with the pessimistic and very pessimistic scenarios standing at a 
lower level than of the market price at the end of 2009 which was $17,92. 
Focusing in the approach in which there are changes in both WACC and growth 
rate (Fig. 23 (b)), the dispersion has a lower magnitude but yet significant. In these 
analysis, the price per share range between $10,44 and $18,18 in the case of United and 
between $14,08 and $25,48 in the case of Continental. By analyzing the results achieved, 
it is visible that in both cases in most of the pessimist scenarios (the ones with a higher 
WACC and lower growth rate) the price per share are lower than the market value. The 
opposite situation is visible in the most optimistic scenarios. 
4.5.5. Conclusion 
The three valuation methods, which taken in account several different aspects, 
given consistent results among them. Besides that, can be established a target price of 
$13,8 per share for United and $18,2 per share for Continental by taking in account the 
shares outstanding at the beginning of 2010. When analyzed the estimated equity values, 
the estimated results represent an upside potential of 7% in the case of United and a 
downside potential of around 11% in the case of Continental’s case by taking in account 
the market cap of both airlines at the end of 2009. However, when these values are 
translate into prices per shares the estimated price per shares represent an upside potential 
of 7% and 2% in the case of United and Continental respectively by taking as reference 
the prices observed at 31st December, 2009 which were $12,9 and $17,9 respectively. 
The previous results demonstrate that both airlines are slightly undervalued in the 
market which is a consequence of the lack of confidence as well as the hard economic 
environment lived at the time. By analyzing each of the historical airlines price per share 
can be stated that the cyclicality characteristic of this industry and at the same time the 




In the next section will be analyzed the two airlines joined without considering 
synergies that can arise from this deal. 
5. Valuation of the Merged Firm 
5.1. Valuation of the merged firm without synergies 
 In this section is analyzed the merger of the two airlines without considering the 
possible synergies that arise from the M&A deal. Therefore, it is assumed that with the 
merger of the two airlines they will not incur in restructuring costs neither will achieve 
additional benefits such as revenues enhancements or cost cuts by operating jointly being 
only the sum of the two airlines as they are individually. 
 In the forecast balance sheet and income statement of the merged firm (App. 48 
and 50) is visible that the revenues and costs are simply the sum of the individual 
estimations based in the assumptions referred in the previous sections. The same situation 
is visible in the capital expenditures, depreciation and the net working capital. 
 For this situation are also conducted a valuation through the FCFF and APV 
method in order to analyze the value of equity. In the case of the FCFF, to calculate the 
WACC is assumed the same risk-free rate and market risk premium used in the individual 
valuation. In the case of beta is calculate as a weighted average of the individual betas by 
taking in consideration the current market capitalization of each airline in order to reflect 
the proportion of each individual firm in the new entity. From this, the value of the merged 
firm beta is 1,728.  Regarding with the debt-to-value ratio, as this case is only the sum of 
the individual debt, is also a weighted average of the individual ratios which give a ratio 
of 76% with an equal cost of debt since are not yet considered financial synergies. With 
these inputs, the WACC is estimated to be 7,52% which is used to discount the free-cash 
flows that assuming the same growth rate for the terminal value and subtracting the net 
debt give an equity value of $4,561 million. 
 Relatively to the APV method, the unlevered cost of equity is calculated through 
the same equation mentioned previously (equation 3) in order to discount the free-cash 
flows. Using as inputs the same cost of debt and ta debt-to-equity ratio of 3,19, is 
estimated an unlevered cost of equity of 10%. Relatively to the interest tax shield is follow 
the same methodology used in the individual valuation by using a tax rate of 37% over 
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the interest paid and discount them at the cost of debt. Finally, the bankruptcy costs are 
also the same since the corporate rating stay unchangeable. Taking these all aspects in 
account is estimated a merged firm’ equity value of $4,560, thus confirming the result 
obtained in the FCFF approach. 
However, when two firms engage in an M&A deal is with the purpose of take 
advantage of synergies which would not be possible if they continued operating alone. 
The estimated synergies that is expected to arise from the United-Continental merger are 
analyzed in the next sections. 
5.2. Synergies estimation 
 The synergies estimation plays a crucial role in the valuation of a M&A deal 
influencing the complete process. According with Bruner (2004) is important to define 
the synergies in a real and reliable way in order to give a competitive advantage to the 
post-merger firm over the competitors and increase the shareholder’s wealth.  
In order to have a context in the synergies estimation are analyzed the previous 
mergers occurred in last years which involved US major and global airlines. At this time, 
the main airline mergers were the US Airways-American West in 2005 and Delta 
Airlines-Northwest Airlines  in 2008, which were all airlines with a significant market 
share namely in the domestic market. In the next sections are estimated the United-
Continental synergies by taking in account the way as the previous merger estimated their 
synergies, the results achieved them until the moment (if information are available) as 
well as the current and forecast economic conditions and the reports issued by The 
American Antitrust Institute (AAI). 
5.2.1. Revenue enhancement synergies  
 According with Moss (2013), the revenue enhancement is in average 60% of the 
synergies achieved in an airline merger being their main source the optimization of the 
routes network. The merger between the United and Continental will allow them to take 
advantage from their hubs that are located in different regions of the US territory. As it is 
visible in the App. 53, the airports served by Continental and not from the United are 
more concentrated at the South while the only United’s served airports are more 
concentrated in the North and West being an evidence of the future complementary that 
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the post-merger airline can benefit and which will allow it to respond strategically to the 
competition.  
 Due the merger, the fare prices can increase since the merged airline will reduce 
the number of flights in the same route in order to avoid overlap flights which will reduce 
the total available capacity. However, the fare prices’ increase and the lower capacity 
level will open space for the entrance of new airlines, namely low-cost airlines, which 
will enter in these routes to provide lower fares. This scenario are more probable to 
happen in the domestic market since, as stated before, the low-cost airlines have a more 
significant presence. So, it is not expected a significant increase of fare prices in the 
domestic market by which the increase of revenues will be more related with the increase 
of passenger transported with the new route network. 
The previous facts are also extend to the regional and cargo segment which will 
benefit of more extensive and optimized route network increasing the efficiency of these 
segments. Relatively to the international segment, the hubs location will allow the new 
airline to have a broader network in terms of the international service and it can achieves 
price gains since despite the competition to be significant it is lower when compared with 
the domestic market and have certain entry barriers which can create space to increase 
the fare price. 
Before these facts, the entity post-merger will mainly benefit from the greater 
scope and scale of the network, the fleet optimization due the combination of their routes 
and from a strong connectivity between the major cities. 
By taking in account a slight higher margin for the international segments than for 
the domestic and regional segments it is expected that the total revenues synergies will 
be 0,3% of the total revenues achieved by the combination of the two airlines in 2010. 
This percentage reflect both the small recovery of the economy and the restrictions that 
can arise in the combination of routes. After this year, the total revenue synergy will grow 
gradually stabilizing from 2014 ahead around of 0,8%. With this estimation, it is expected 
an average annual revenue gross synergy of approximately $154 million which is much 
more conservative than the estimations presented by both airlines which was around of 
$800 million (United’s presentation 2010). By comparing with the similar transactions is 
also stated that it is conservative since the US Airways-American West estimation was of 
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$360 million and the Delta-Northwest estimation was of around $700 million (Moss 
2013).  
5.2.2. Cost saving synergies 
 The merged airline will benefit mainly from cost savings which arise from a better 
use of the facilities or leaseholds. This type of synergies are more visible in operating 
expenses such as the aircraft rentals, the maintenance or distribution expenses originating 
an increase of the operation efficiency by cutting double expenses. 
 As saw in the previous sections, the wages and jet fuel expenses have the most 
significant weights in the operating expenses of both airlines and consequently in the 
merged entity. However, the jet fuel as commodity is vulnerable to the crude price which 
can be very volatile by which cannot be assumed a direct synergy from the reductions in 
the jet fuel expense.  Nevertheless, the new airline can be able to enter in more hedge fuel 
contracts in order to minimize the jet fuel price volatility by which is assumed a small 
percentage of 0,1% per annum in order to reflect the synergies that can arise from this 
contracts. 
 Relatively to the wages expenses synergies was followed the trend that was 
observed mainly in the Delta-Southwest merger. This cost ‘component has a significant 
potential of synergies by cutting the number of employees that are exercising the same 
function. However, as stated in the previous sections, both airlines have their major 
employees represented by unions which difficult the cuts in the workforce. From that and 
taking in account a more conservative view of which actually happened in the first two 
years of the Delta-Southwest merger is estimate a reduction of 1,5% in the wages 
expenses in 2010 following by a reduction of 1% in 2011 and 0,5% in 2012 being the 
employee’ early retirement the major way of the cuts. 
 Other important expense item is the regional purchase agreements expenses. After 
the merger, the airline can rescind some of the contracts that both airlines had previously 
to the merger in order to increase the efficiency and avoid the overlapping routes. By 
taking in account this fact is estimated a decrease of 0,3% in this expenses relatively to 
the estimated value without synergies in 2010 following by an increase of this reduction 
until 2013 to around 1%. Until 2015, the last year assumed to have this type of synergies 
is estimated a gradually decrease of the synergy rate until 0,5% reflecting the increasing 
trend of the passenger’ demand  which can increase the need of this type of contracts.  
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 Similar with the regional capacity agreements, the new airline can also cut in the 
aircrafts rentals since with the merger the set of aircrafts will be larger and the need of 
engage in operational leasing will be smaller originating a source for cost saving. Before 
that is estimated a small decrease of 0,1% in 2010 since this type of leasing contracts can 
have some restrictions in their termination, increasing similarly with the regional 
agreements expenses in the follow years, until achieve a 0,5% of reduction in 2015, the 
last year. 
 Finally, the other costs which includes the passenger services, the maintenance or 
the distribution costs also is estimated to decrease and be a source of efficiency to the new 
airline. In this type of expenses can be cut the excess of resources applied as well as 
increase the efficiency by the implementing the existing technology of each airline in the 
other which had not access. From that, is estimated a small reduction of 0,1% in 2010, 
due the restrictions that can arise from this type of cuts in the first year. After this year is 
estimated a gradually increase of this synergy until 0,8% in 2014 being followed by a 
period of a gradual decrease until 2017, year in which this synergy achieves a value of 
0,5%. 
 Before this synergies sources, is estimated an average annual cost saving synergy 
of $196 million which are very close to the valuation presented by United (2010) that 
estimate a cost saving between of $200 million and $300 million per annum. When 
compared with the similar mergers can also be stated that it is in line with the annual $270 
million of cost savings in the US Airways and America West Airlines according with data 
provided by Moss (2013) however, more conservative than the estimated annual cost 
savings of around $600 million in the Delta-Northwest merger. 
5.2.3. Capital expenditures synergies 
 As stated in the individual airlines valuation, both airlines have capital 
commitments and future capital acquisition options, namely over new aircrafts purchases. 
However, when the two airlines join their aircraft fleet they will benefit from a 
complementary relation since each airline has types of aircrafts which the other one 
doesn’t has available (App. 54). For example the United Airlines has 24 Boeings 747 
which are more appropriated to long-range flights but the Continental doesn’t have any 
aircraft of this type. Relatively to Continental Airlines, it has 226 Boeings 737 which are 
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suitable for short and medium long distance flights, type of aircrafts which the United 
doesn´t have.  
 These aircraft fleet complementary beyond to allow the new airline to optimize 
the routes and respond in a more flexible way to the passenger demand will allow it to 
decrease the amount of capital expenditures needed, since the post-merger airline can 
reduces the expected number of purchased aircrafts namely the ones which the airlines 
don’t have contract and only the purchase option. In addition, the new airline will take 
advantage of the technology already implement in both airlines.  
By taking in account the capital expenditures value estimation given by the 
airlines, namely the amount needed to purchase the new aircrafts presented by 
Continental, is estimated a decrease of 1% in the capital expenditures in 2010. This rate 
will increase gradually to 6% until 2014 in order to reflect the integration’ level of both. 
From this year, the rate will decrease to 1% in 2016, the last year assumed to be possible 
achieve this type of synergies. This trend that is estimated to be observed from 2014 
reflects the need of the new airline in purchase new technologies or even new aircrafts in 
order to increase the operation efficiency and face the estimated increase of the passenger’ 
demand, by which is assumed that after this year will not be possible incur in more capital 
expenditures synergies. 
5.2.4. Financial synergies  
The merger between United and Continental Airlines, two large firms in their 
industry, will originate a larger and more diversified firm with a higher market share and 
enhanced conditions. According with JP Morgan (2009) these factors could result in 
better credit conditions for the entity post-merger with a reduction of the cost of capital 
through corporate rating upgrades mainly in merger of equals which is the case.  
At December 31, 2009, both airlines had a corporate rating of B- which mean that 
both firms are considerable below the investment grade level. However, with the merger 
is expected an improvement of the credit conditions since the new airline will have a 
significant market share and will be one of the leaders in this market. Also when is 
analyzed previous airlines mergers most of them had a rating upgrade. Before this, it is 
expected a slight upgrade from B- to B grade by maintaining a conservative approach. 
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With an upgrade for B level, the required debt spread will decrease slightly from 
5,2% to 5% (Damodaran 2011) which consequently will decrease the debt cost from 9% 
to 8,8%. As the debt-to-value ratio and cost of equity will be kept unchangeable, the 
WACC will decrease from 7,6% to 7,4%. This credit rating upgrade will be also translate 
in a slight decrease of the probability default used in the APV method, from 30,41% to 
30,61% according with S&P (2011). 
5.2.5. Restructuring costs 
  When a firm engages in a M&A deal incurs in restructuring costs which reflect 
the costs of the integration of both firm’s operations. In the case of the United-Continental 
merger also is expected a significant amount of restructuring costs which can be primarily 
classified as costs related with the own merger transaction, severance costs, facilities 
restructuring and contracts restructures, by taking in account the similar mergers that 
happened in last years. 
 The costs related with the merger transaction are the costs related with the own 
deal which the firm incur. In terms of the severance costs, as mentioned before, is 
estimated a reduction of the workforce and this process only is possible by the payment 
of severances which are additional costs incurred due the merger. In addition to the 
merger and severance costs, there are also the facilities restructuring costs which are the 
costs incurred by the firms in integration process of their facilities and by adapting them 
to the post-merger entity. Finally, the contracts restructures costs are primarily expect to 
be related with the early termination of the regional capacity purchase contracts as well 
as with aircraft rentals ones which have additional costs when rescinded before the time 
stipulated. 
 By taking in account a more conservative view of the restructuring costs incurred 
by Delta-Northwest merger in the first two years (Delta, 2010) is estimated that this costs 
will be 5% of the United-Continental airlines’ operating revenues in 2010. These costs 
are estimated to decrease gradually until 2014, year in which is estimated that these costs 
will represent 1% of the operating revenues. This year is estimate to be the last year in 





5.3. Valuation of the merged firm with synergies 
 After defining the synergies sources was conducted a valuation of the merged 
airlines by including them. In order to verify the feasibility of the valuation were 
conducted a valuation through the FCFF (App. 58) and the APV approach (App. 59) 
similarly with which were realized in the previous sections. 
 The free cash-flows assumed in this section already take in account the revenue 
enhancements, the cost saving and the capital expenditure reductions synergies. In the 
FCFF approach is assumed the new WACC, of 7,44%, which incorporate the financial 
synergy described above. Discounting the new cash-flows by the new WACC and 
maintaining the remaining components unchangeable is achieved an enterprise value of 
$17,745 million which after subtracting the total debt give an estimated equity value of 
$6,269 million.   
 Relatively to the APV approach, the new free-cash flows are discounted by the 
unlevered cost of equity of 9,9% which incorporate the new interest rate (Eq. 4.1.) 
described in the financial synergies, giving a total unlevered enterprise value of $11,493 
million. In terms of the interest tax shield, by also taking in account the new cost of debt 
of 8,8%, is achieved a total value of $6,954. In the calculation of the bankruptcy costs is 
assumed that they will remain at 20% of the unlevered enterprise value but as the new 
airline has a higher credit rating grade it will have a lower probability of default which 
according S&P (2011) is 30,61%. By taking in account all of these components is 
achieved an enterprise value of $17,744 million which after subtract the total amount of 
debt give an estimate equity value of $6,268 thus confirming the result achieved in the 
FCFF method. 
 The net synergies value will be the difference between the enterprise value 
achieved in the case in which the merger airlines is assumed to be only the sum of both 
airlines as they are independently without considering the synergies and the enterprise 
value achieved when considered the synergies estimation, the value showed here in this 
section. From this, the net synergies value is estimated to be around of $1,707 million 
which represent an increase of the estimated equity value of 37,4% when compared with 




5.4 Breakdown and analysis of the synergy value 
 In this section is analyzed in more detail the contribution of each of synergy 
sources for the total value synergies achieved. For this purpose is analyzed individually 
the impact of each synergy source in the total enterprise value as can be stated in the Fig. 
24. 
Figure 24. Breakdown of the synergy value 
 
Following the information provided in the previous sections is estimated a total 
gross synergy value of $3,091 million. The revenues enhancements synergies represent 
53% of them being its largest contributor and thus being in line with Moss (2013) which 
stated that the majority of the synergies in this industry comes from the revenues 
enhancements. From the revenues synergies can be highlighted the contribution of the 
two segments: the domestic segment that will contribute with 24% and the international 
segment with 27% of the total gross revenues. The others revenues which includes for 
example the cargo transportation and the baggage fee represent 3% of the total gross 
amount. 
In terms of cost savings, they represent 34% of the total gross synergies. In this 
type of synergies can be highlighted the regional capacity expenses synergies which 
contributes for 3% of it and the wages expenses synergies which contributes for 4%. 
Relatively to the fuel costs expenses synergies represent only 3% due the reasons 
mentioned previously while the aircraft rentals expenses synergies represent individually 
2% of the total estimated gross synergy. 
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Finally the financial synergies, linked with the rating grade upgrade, contributes 
for 4% of the gross synergies while the capital expenditures reduction synergies 
contributes for 5% of it. When all these synergies are taken in account in the valuation is 
achieved a synergy value higher in $102 million relatively to the sum of the previously 
items. This type of synergies are here mentioned as other synergies and represent 2% of 
the total gross value. This type of synergies represent the ones that are not directly 
attributable to a specific area but that occur due the conjunction of all improvements that 
the firm experiences.  In terms of restructuring costs is estimated a present value of $1,384 
million which by subtracting to the gross synergies give the total net synergies of $1,418. 
The Fig 25. shows the synergy waterfall in order to provide a clearer portrait of the 
estimated synergies.  
Figure 25. Synergy waterfall 
 
6. Acquisition Process 
In this section is clarified the main aspects about the transaction and under what 
conditions the transaction must occur. The merger between United and Continental 
Airlines is seen and classified as a merger of equals since both have a similar dimension. 
None of them can be clearly indicated as acquirer or acquired due their similar dimensions 
and current conditions, however, the United is seen as the one that took the merger 
initiative by which is commonly referred as the acquirer firm. From that, in this section 
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is analyzed the perspective of a United offer to Continental’s shareholders despite the fact 
of both are of the same dimension which can result in an equally owned new airline. 
The United-Continental merger as horizontal merger will consolidate its position 
in both domestic and international market with a larger network. This merger will allow 
the new airline surpass the hard economic environment lived by uniting their capabilities 
and resources and by optimizing the flights. The new airline will be a global class airline 
with a more diversified offer and a stronger presence in the domestic and international 
segments becoming the airline with more ASM’s as well as one of the largest airlines in 
terms of market capitalization, by taking in account the indicators observed in 2009. 
6.1. Synergy benefits’ distribution 
In order to determine the transaction’ value and estimate the premium that the 
acquirer firm is able to pay in order to induce the target firm to engage in the deal is 
important to determine the share of each of the parties in the estimated synergies.  
In the case of United-Continental merger, as was analyzed, each of the parties will 
contribute with similar capabilities and resources which will allow the new airline to 
benefit of a complementary relation. However, due the similarity and complementary 
relation is difficult to estimate concretely the percentage of the synergies that each airline 
will contribute. Given this, the most appropriate method to calculate it, is by assuming 
that each of the airlines will generate and have right over the synergy percentage that 
equals to its weight in the total  merged airline’ enterprise value without considering the 
synergies.  
The enterprise value of the merged airline without considering the synergies is 
$16,037 million. By taking in account the individual valuation of each airline can be 
stated that the United will have a weight of 54% in the merged airline’ enterprise value 
while the Continental will have a weight of 46%. So, from this is stipulated that the United 
will receive 54% of the net synergies while the Continental will receive 46% of it. 
6.2. Estimation of the premium to be offered 
As is already known the percentage of each airline in the estimated synergies, in 
this section is calculated and explained the premium that United will offer to Continental. 
As merger of equals is assumed that will have a premium to be paid to Continental’s 
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shareholders in order to induce them to engage in the merger ‘deal and reinforce the 
friendly nature of the transaction. 
The Continental Airlines presented a market capitalization of $2,483 million at 
December 31, 2009 however, as stated in the standalone valuation conducted in the 
previous sections, the estimated equity value is lower in around 11% value with an 
estimated value of $2,237million. When considered the Continental equity value with its 
share in the estimated synergies, the value increases to $2,885 million representing an 
upside potential of around 34,9% in relation to the standalone valuation. By taking in 
account all these aspects is calculated a premium of 21,6% in relation to the Continental’s 
market cap.  
Figure 26. Summary of the premium offered calculations 
 
6.3. Method of payment 
The method of payment, as described in literature review, plays an important role 
in a M&A deal being an aspect before which the market are very susceptible since it 
shows the confidence’s level of the investors about the transaction success and about their 
estimations.  
 Usually in a merger of equals the shareholders of both firms are willing to sell 
their shares in exchange of securities issued by the post-merger entity by which in this 
type of transaction the payment is always did through stock payments (Giddy, 2006). 
One of the main advantages of an all stock payments in this merger is that both 
United and Continental’s shareholders will share the future risk which will give a certain 
security level for each of the deal’s parties. In the market perspective, the all stock 
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payment will transmits the idea that both parties are confident in the future investment’ 
success and both want to be represented in the new airline to have a share in the future 
gains. Finally, with an all-stock payment, the United avoid to issue new debt which would 
lead to a higher debt ratio and higher debt costs due its credit rating grade. 
6.4. The merger proposal 
 According with Fig. 26, the total transaction amount is estimated to be $3,018 
million which reflect the Continental’s equity value and its percentage in the estimated 
synergies representing the premium to be paid. As the merger will be totally realized with 
stock, the United Airlines needs to establish the exchange ratio of shares, or by other 
words, it needs to establish the total amount of shares that the Continental’s Airlines 
shareholders will receive in the merged airline. In order to calculate the exchange ratio is 
followed the equation 6.1 (Gaughan 2011):  
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟
 
According with the estimated Continental’s equity value with synergies, the offer 
price is establish to be $24,5 per share which by taking in account the United’s price per 
share of $19,35 (also reflecting the airline’s share in the synergies) give an exchange ratio 
of 1,27, or by other words, each Continental’s shareholders will receive 1,27 United’s 
shares.  
6.5. Industry regulation issues and related risks 
As stated in the industry analysis, the US airline industry was deregulated which 
meant a decrease of the government power in this industry. However, there are some 
specific regulations that are needed to take in account mainly in a case of a merger of this 
dimension. 
 According with the annual reports of both airlines, the largest US airports, most 
of them served by United and Continental, were subject to government regulation in terms 
of the airport’ access rights. Airports such as JFK and La Guardia in the New York area 
or the Reagan National Airport in Washington D.C. have domestic restrictions in terms 
of access rights since these airports are classified by FAA as ‘high density traffic airports’. 




there is the probability of the new airline not fulfill with the requirements by exceeding 
its recommended share in these airports. A similar situation can also be verified in the 
domestic routes which can lead to a capacity reduction in the new airline. 
 A similar situation also happen in the international flights. As referred in the 
industry analysis section, the US has several ‘open skies’ agreements however, there are 
some geographical regions in which the US doesn’t has agreements or whose airports 
have also access restrictions as happen in the London Heathrow Airport, the São Paulo 
Guarulhos Airport or the Beijing Capital International Airport, in which both airlines have 
a significant presence. These facts can impose some restrictions in possible future plans 


























In last years, the M&A deals are seen by the US airlines as way to consolidate its 
position in the market and a way to surpass the difficult economic environment derived 
from the global recession and which had deep consequences in this industry. In line 
with this trend, the United and Continental announced a merger between them that will 
create one of the largest global airlines and which was here analyzed. 
Through the dissertation was mentioned several advantages which the new airline 
will benefit from the merger. The majority of the estimated synergies were related with 
the passenger transportation revenues derived from the more diversified network route 
in both domestic and international segments. The other important synergies source is 
the cost savings that the new airline will benefit by implementing more efficiently 
procedures and by cutting double fixed costs. Also linked with this synergy source, the 
new airline will benefit of a larger aircraft fleet which allow it to optimize its operation 
according with the demand’s passenger in easier and more flexible way. 
According with the current conditions of both airlines and by taking in account 
the economic perspectives for the next years is estimated an combined airline’ equity 
value of $6,269 million which represents an increase of 37,4% in relation of the equity 
value of the combined equity without synergies. With this result, the new airline will 
be one of the US largest carriers in terms of market capitalization by taking as reference 
the values observed in 2009 as well as the largest airlines in terms of ASM’s. 
From these results is estimated a 21,6% premium to be offer from United Airlines 
over the current Continental’s market capitalization since this airline are commonly 
referred as the target airline. This premium added to the Continental’s estimated value 
give a total transaction amount of $3,018 million which is here suggested to be paid 
all in stock. 








Appendix 1. Classification of the airlines according with US DOT 
Classification Level of revenue Type of services 
Major airlines Over $1 billion National /International flights 
National Airlines $100 million-$1 billion Commonly national flights 
Regional Airlines $20 -$100 million Specific region flights 
Cargo Airlines* - Transport of goods 
*Can be classified also in the previous groups 
Source: US Department of Transportation 
Appendix 2. US major airlines in 2009 
Airline Firm  Observations 
ABX Air  Cargo Airline 
AirTran Airways  Low-cost Airline – subsidiary of Southwest 
Alaska Airlines   
American Airlines   
American Eagle Airlines 
 
Regional division of American Airlines 
Atlantic Southeast Airlines   
Atlas Air  Cargo and passenger charter airline 
Comair  Wholly owned subsidiary of Delta Airlines 
Continental Airlines   
Delta Airlines   
Federal Express  Cargo Airline 
Frontier Airlines  Low-cost airlines 






Merger with Delta Approved in 2008 




United Airlines   
UPS Airlines  Cargo Airlines 
US Airways   
World Airways  Most of operations are non-schedule services 
Source: US Department of Transportation 
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Appendix 3. Top ten airlines in terms of market capitalization-20099 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Appendix 4. Top ten airlines in terms of international destiny passengers transported-
200910 
 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market and Air Tansport Association11. 







                                                          
9 Referent to all airline services 
10 Referent to all airline services 
11 Air Transportation Association 
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Appendix 5: Top airlines in terms of RPMs and ASMs-200912 
 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market and Air Tansport Association13. 
Percentages calculated by the author.  
Appendix 6: Top passengers airlines in terms of RTMs-200914 
 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market and Air Tansport Association15. 
Percentages calculated by the author. 
Appendix 7: Top passengers airlines in terms of Operating Profit-200916 
 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market. Percentages calculated by the author.  
                                                          
12 Referent to all airline services 
13 Air Transportation Association 
14 Referent to all airline services 
15 Air Transportation Association 
16 Referent to all airline services 
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Appendix 8: Evolution of the annual U.S domestic average itinerary fare17 
 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Percentages calculated by the author.  
Appendix 9: Evolution of the total passenger transported in U.S airline industry (2003-
2009) 
 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market. Percentages calculated by the author.  
                                                          
17 At constant prices of 2013 
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Appendix 10: Evolution of RPM’s and ASM’s of the US airline industry (2004-2009)
 
Source of data: Bureau of Transportation Statistics T-100 Market. Percentages calculated by the author.  
Appendix 11: Evolution of the fuel price per gallon 
 
Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics 
Appendix 12: Evolution of the operating profit/loss and the net income of the US 
airline industry (2004-2009) 
 




Appendix 13. Evolution of US airline industry ‘current and quick ratios (2005-2006) 
 
Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics 
Appendix 14. Evolution of US airline industry’s return on assets and return on equity 
(2005-2006) 
(a)          (b) 
Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics 
Appendix 15. Evolution of US airline industry’s debt ratio and debt-to-equity ratio 
(2005-2006) 
(a)        (b) 
Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics 
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Appendix 16. Evolution of the number of passengers transported by United18 (2005-
2009) 
 
Source: United’ Annual Reports  
Appendix 17. Evolution of the United’s RPM and ASM (2005-2009) 
 
Source: United’ Annual Reports  








Source: United’ Annual Reports  
                                                          




Appendix 19. Growth rates of the main components of United’s operating expenses  
 
Source: United’ Annual Reports  
Appendix 20. United’ average price per gallon of fuel jet (2005-2006) 
 
Source: United’ Annual Reports 
Appendix 21. Evolution of the number of passengers transported by Continental (2005-
2009) 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports  
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Appendix 22. Evolution of the Continental’s RPM and ASM (2005-2009) 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports  
 
Appendix 23. Growth rates of Continental’s operating revenues 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Report 
Appendix 24. Growth rates of the main components of Continental’s operating 
expenses 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports 
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Appendix 25. Continental’ average price per gallon of fuel jet (2005-2006) 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports 
Appendix 26. Evolution of Continental’s capital expenditures components (2005-2006) 
 
Source: Continental’ Annual Reports 
Appendix 27. FED US growth predictions 
Source: US Fed 
Appendix 28. GDP growth predictions 
Source: Global Insight and FAA. 
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Appendix 29. Revenues growth assumptions 
Source: FAA 






Appendix 31. Estimation of NWC and short-term investments of United Airlines 
Appendix 32. Estimation of CAPEX and depreciation of United Airlines 




























Appendix 37.  United’s FCFF approach 















Appendix 40. Estimation of the NWC and short-term investments of Continental 
Appendix 41. Estimation of Capex and depreciation of Continental Airlines 











Appendix 43. Continental’s debt summary 


















Appendix 46. Continental’s FCFF approach 





Appendix 48. Historical and Forecasted Balance Sheet of the merged airline without 
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Appendix 49. NWC, CAPEX and Depreciation of the airline merged without synergies 
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Appendix 50. Historical and Forecasted Income Statement of airline merged without 
synergies 




Appendix 52. Merged airline without synergies - APV approach 
Appendix 53. Localization of exclusive United and Continental’ served airports 











Source of table: United-Continental final investor presentation 




Appendix 56. Merged airline with synergies debt’ summary 











Appendix 58. Merged airline with synergies - FCFF approach 
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